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The purpose of this study was to reconsider what has 
historically been called "Romantic” in American education. 
What I discovered was the ubiquity of organicism— an 
organicism which, when applied to education, promises to 
heal divisions with connection and integration. A reading 
of Romanticism as organicism is a traditional 
interpretation which fails to acknowledge the revisionist 
work of critics like de Man, Hartman, Bloom, and McFarland, 
who regard the Romantic recognition of language and self- 
consciousness as providing alienation, not unity. However, 
education continues to regard the Romantics as organicists 
and to provide organic remedies, such as the organic 
reforms proposed in the work of John Dewey, Harold Rugg, 
Caroline Pratt, Paul Goodman, Ivan Illich, and John 
Willinsky. These educators adopt mechanistic metaphors in 
describing traditions they wish to see replaced and organic 
metaphors in urging their proposals for integration and 
connection. In chapters four and five, I focus on organic 
theories of writing and reading suggested by Dewey's 
aesthetics and by Willinsky's theories of language arts.
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Emerson's influence on American education is 
extensive, but educators read him in a traditional way— as 
an organicist— disregarding his recognition of language and 
self-consciousness as creating the division between 
humankind and nature. This organicist interpretation of 
Emerson has especially dominated the process rhetoric 
endorsed by Willinsky. Regarding language and the 
imagination as implements of mediation, both Dewey and 
Willinsky assume a symbolic theory of language, and they 
argue, metaphysically, that reading and writing result in 
communication and shared meaning. Assuming an autonomous, 
centered subject, they see writing and reading as vehicles 
for connecting self with self and self with a community of 
others.
In chapter five I propose an interpretive model 
inspired by Shoshana Felman's reading of Lacan, one 
recognizing an asymmetrical triadic configuration of 
student, teacher, and Otherness— a triad which questions 
the mirrored narcissism of the organic model by suggesting 
the introduction of the unconscious as a source of new 
knowledge, a model which seeks the return not of a 
confirming sameness but of difference. In straining to 
effect connection, organicist educators have ignored 
Otherness, language, and difference.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The Romantic poets and thinkers of the nineteenth 
century have been misread by American educators. They have 
been misread as organicists, pantheists, primitivists, 
idealists, and solipsists while their most significant 
contribution— their recognition of the discontinuity 
between language and nature— has been overlooked. That 
this contribution has been neglected, that they have been 
defined for us as nature worshipers and organicists, and 
that these misreadings have been translated into an 
educational philosophy called "Romantic" may be attributed 
to the ingenuous readings of educators; however, a more 
likely basis for this common interpretation is the work of 
literary historians of Romanticism and New Critical 
theorists whose interpretations eventually reified the 
critical canon that defined "Romanticism" for generations 
of Americans.
As a consequence of these interpretations, educators 
have read the Romantics primarily as wholistic reconcilers 
of fissures between subject and object, as synthesizers who 
imaginatively heal ruptures. Commanding Romantic critics 
such as Northrop Frye, Rene Wellek, and M. H. Abrams 
canonized such interpretations. Compounding the problem of
these influential historians who established the Romantics 
as "nature poets" and organicists was the approach of New 
Critics1 like T. S. Eliot, who attacked what he considered 
the excessive inwardness and subjectivity of the Romantics.
In arguing that these critics have laid the foundation 
for this historical misreading, I am not suggesting an 
ideological conspiracy, for I plan to acknowledge Romantic 
texts that prompted these interpretations. What I do argue 
is that the Romantics longed for a symbolic language that 
could represent union but that they expressed allegorically 
the reality of their fragmentation. In one voice-— the 
dominant voice— the Romantics recognized their own self- 
consciousness and temporal instability and contrasted it 
with the superiority of nature's unselfconsciousness and 
permanence. This voice of recognition, what Paul de Man 
calls "this painful knowledge," is, in the words of de Man, 
the "true voice" of Romanticism (RT 191). In establishing 
organic interpretations, readers have ignored this voice.
In another voice— the voice that supports organic 
readings-— the Romantics express desire and longing in 
symbolic language that imaginatively attempts to remove the 
burden of consciousness. De Man identifies the conflict as 
one between allegorical language, a "self seen in its 
authentically temporal predicament," and symbolic language, 
"a defensive strategy that tries to hide from this negative 
self-knowledge" (RT 191). The Romantics, according to de
Man, engage in "tenacious self-mystification" (RT 191) when 
they, as Coleridge does, endorse symbol over allegory.
De Man says the
historical scheme . . . differs entirely from the 
customary picture. The dialectical relationship 
between subject and object is no longer the 
central statement of romantic thought, but this 
dialectic is now located entirely in the temporal 
relationships that exist within a system of 
allegorical signs. (RT 191)
The historians of Romanticism and the New Criticism 
read only the Romantics' wish to deny time, read only their 
nostalgia for the natural obj ect, read, in other words, 
only their defensive strategies and ignore their failure to 
achieve this identification.2 When their imagination 
allows the Romantics what de Man calls "tranqui11ity" and 
Harold Bloom calls "reciprocity," these imaginative 
identifications are even then "far from having been 
definitively reconquered"; they are, instead, what de Man 
terms "moments of peace" (IS 15) and what Bloom 
characterizes as coming "only in flashes" (9).
In their eagerness for synthesis, "Romantic" educators 
have chosen to respond to the flashes while disregarding 
what Thomas McFarland says "saturates" Romanticism: 
longing, incompleteness, fragmentation, ruin (7). Any 
Romantic impulse toward coincidence— a self-identifying or 
self-seeking union with nature— de Man has seen as "only 
one passing moment" and "a negative moment at that, since 
it represents a temptation that has to be overcome";
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it does not, de Man reasons, "designate the main romantic 
experience" (RT 188). It is, however, these "flashes" and 
"passing moments" that educators and their critics have 
characterized as constitutive of "Romanticism" in 
education.
In short, "organic" Romanticism is the Romanticism of 
education. I contend, first, that organicism should not be 
termed "Romantic" by those who wish to draw parallels 
between organic reform measures and the Romantic poets and 
thinkers of the nineteenth century (doing so reduces the 
Romantics to naive nature worshipers) and, second, that the 
organic model neglects the complexities of cognitive 
relationships between student, teacher, and knowledge. 
Instead, I will argue that the desire for organic unity is 
an indulgence in a kind of mystif ication and that a more 
appropriate model would recognize not organic identity but 
otherness and would acknowledge what the Romantics 
appreciated: the instability of language.
In succeeding chapters I hope to demonstrate the 
tenacity of the organic model by delineating the history of 
an idea as it has appeared in the work of six educators—  
Progressives John Dewey, Harold Rugg, Caroline Pratt; 
deschooling philosophers Paul Goodman and Ivan Illich; and 
writing and reading theorist John Willinsky. I have made 
no effort at equal treatment, for I consider Dewey and 
Willinsky central to my criticism of "Romantic" organicism
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and my own proposal to establish an alternative 
interpretive model. Running parallel to the organic 
philosophies of these educators is a century of debate over 
organic-mechanistic concepts of writing— -a debate that 
mirrors the reform rhetoric of the six educators I've named 
and one whose organic components supposedly derive from 
Deweyan and Romantic expressionism.
John Willinsky's endorsement of expressionistic 
writing and reader-response reading is but the latest 
effort at establishing writing and reading as organic 
processes that call for a student's "sovereign, self-aware 
consciousness at the center" (Crowley 32) of these 
"natural" acts. Willinsky has invoked the "earlier voices" 
of the Romantics— especially the British Romantics— and has 
called for their "music" to be "replayed and reworked" (NL 
188). But is Willinsky's inspiration "Romantic," and are 
his attempts at synthesis sound?
Although he credits the muses of Romanticism with his 
adoption of organic theories of writing (a "connecting," an 
"integrating" of "the learner into what is to be learned") 
(NL 56) and reading (an "organic relationship" between 
readers and texts) (NL 70), I suggest that his relationship 
to the Romantics does not spring from what de Man calls the 
"main romantic experience."
In these early chapters, I plan both to establish the 
durability of organic educational philosophy and to
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question its application to perceived dualisms in American 
education; in the final chapter I will focus specifically 
on Willinsky's endorsement of the "organic relationship" 
between readers and texts that he wishes to see established 
in the teaching of literature. As an alternative to his 
reader-response and organic models of interpretation, I 
will offer a Lacanian model suggested by the work of 
Shoshana Felman— a model which breaks up the dualism 
Willinsky and other organicists wish to avoid, a strategy 
correlating reader, teacher, and Other in triadic dialogue. 
Felman reminds us that learning is more than self­
reflection, for
self-reflection is always a mirror reflection, 
that is, the illusory functioning, of reasoning 
by the illusory principle of symmetry between 
self and self as well as between self and other; 
a symmetry that subsumes all difference within a 
delusion of a unified and homogenous individual 
identity. (JL 61)
The wholeness and unity offered by dialogical pedagogical 
models, Felman suggests, is "illusory," a fiction. A self­
grounding system accounts for itself by means of self­
reflection and smooths out differences to offer the 
"delusion" of "a unified" identity, but Felman's 
introduction of the Other disrupts this model and moves 
pedagogy from information to an asymmetrical reflexivity. 
This radical alteration of the classroom dyad results from 
Felman's removal of the teacher as the "subject presumed to 
know" (JL 84) and her introduction of thirdness, that is,
her introduction of the Other as a position from which both 
student and teacher hear their own unconscious discourse:
The unconscious is a discourse that is 
other, or ex-centric, to the discourse of a self. 
It is in effect a discourse that is other to 
itself, not in possession of itself; a discourse 
that no consciousness can master and that no 
speaking subject can assume or own.
The unconscious is a discourse that is 
radically intersubiective. Since it is a 
discourse that no consciousness can own, the only 
way a consciousness can hear it is as coming from 
the Other [original emphasis] . . . .  (JL 123)
With the introduction of Otherness in high school and 
university classrooms, the teaching of literature will not 
be synonymous with the transmission of information, that 
is, with students’ memorizing factual information about the 
poetry, novels, and short stories they read— -information 
concerning the biography of an author, the meaning of a 
work, or the intention of an author— information which the 
teacher transfers to the student who responds to an 
anticipated question with an answer which is also expected.
Education should be more than the transmission of 
information; indeed, if pedagogy were defined as the 
transmission of information, then knowledge might be 
thought of as something that could be exhausted. In the 
kind of traditional, symmetrical dialogue defined by many 
educators as the organic union of questioning teacher and 
responding student, both student and teacher tell each 
other what they already know, transmitting information in a 
perpetual and controlled cycle. However, because this
cycle offers the opportunity for both student and teacher 
to express only the knowledge they already possess and 
offers no avenue for accessing a "discourse that is other" 
to "the discourse of a self," then the traditional 
dialogical cycle offers only an unfolding of what is 
already there, of what is already known.
With the introduction of Otherness, students would 
also move beyond the subjective responses to literature 
which Willinsky's pedagogy prescribes. Although Willinsky 
believes literature to be more than the dispensing of 
information, he does not move beyond a call for self­
reflection (or perhaps self-reflection somehow merging with 
the myriad interpretations of a community of readers).
His theory, then, does not recognize the Otherness outside 
the symmetry of self and self or self and others.
But Felman says that there is a discourse outside our 
conscious knowledge, a discourse "not in possession of 
itself," one that "no subj ect can master." While 
organicist educators call for symmetry and a smooth, 
integrated unity of self and other, Felman's pedagogy calls 
on difference, on the introduction of that "ex-centric" to 
"the discourse of a self." The establishing of triadic 
dialogue in a literature class would, then, require more 
than either information retrieval or subjective responses 
to literature. Felman's acknowledgment of Otherness 
recognizes ignorance— both of student and teacher— and
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provides through the introduction of thirdness an avenue 
outside ourselves and outside the duality of self and 
other, an opportunity for us to discover in our ignorance 
new knowledge.
A partial reading of the Romantics by educators is an 
inadequate reading, reducing any application of Romanticism 
to education to the organic model which has been pervasive 
throughout the century. The Romantics can and should be a 
source for paradigm-building in education, but educators 
should consider the important critical work on Romanticism 
accomplished since the late 1960s— work which reveals the 
Romantics' realization of the opposition between 
consciousness and nature. The work of revisionist thinkers 
like de Man, Hartman, Bloom, and McFarland should stimulate 
educators to build Romantic models dedicated not to organic 
connection but to an interpretive or hermeneutic model that 




1. The New Criticism, a critical approach which originated 
in the early 1940s, stressed that each part of a piece of 
literature should support the whole, that a poem or story 
should demonstrate unity and lend itself to a single 
interpretation. Perhaps the most powerful school in 
twentieth-century criticism, the New Criticism included 
such diverse theorists as Eliot, Allan Tate, Robert Penn 
Warren, Cleanth Brooks, John Crowe Ransom, William K. 
Wimsatt, I. A. Richards, William Empson, and others.
Harold Bloom has called them a "secular clergy"; Lindsay 
Waters has questioned their "incarnationalist aesthetics,11 
with "its organicist notion of the literary symbol"; and de 
Man has found their "salvational criticism" to be "overlaid 
with intentions of a mythical and religious order . . . 
aspir[ing] to an ultimate reconciliation on a cosmic scale" 
(see Waters 1; xlv; 1).
2. I use the word "failure" here not to indict the work 
of the Romantics but to indicate the consequences of their 
attempts to assuage alienation and division linguistically.
CHAPTER 2
EMERSON'S LEGACY: A "GREEN AMERICAN TRADITION"?
[T]he green American tradition has its 
beginnings in Ralph Waldo Emerson, and 
Emerson's 'angle of vision' . . . has 
determined its course ever since. To be 
more precise, the green tradition is a 
branch of Emersonian thought emphasizing 
organic process, vital expression, cultural 
and political democracy, and the cultivation 
of indigenous art. (Peck 2)
Has Emerson bequeathed a green legacy of organicism to 
American education? Although John Willinsky credits the 
English Romantics for inspiring much of his organic 
philosophy in composition and reading and Dewey cites 
Wordsworth and Keats more frequently than he does Emerson 
when he attempts to define his aesthetics in Art as 
Experience. Emerson— as interpreted by educators and 
educational criticism-— is the source of much of the organic 
philosophy in American education. He is also central to 
the organic philosophies of composition that Willinsky has 
studied and criticized; Emerson is especially significant 
to an expressionistic-transactionalist debate that is 
currently being waged in rhetoric— -a debate that 
Willinsky's doctrines reflect. Emerson's legacy is a 




How central is Emersonian thought to the 
Progressives,1 and do they, as well as those educators 
following the Progressives, read Emerson's philosophy as 
organic? Emerson is the Romantic whose name is most often 
linked to American progressivism or pragmatism and thus to 
Dewey; moreover, when theorists or critics do not cite 
Emerson, they frequently employ him in derived form—  
through disciples Thoreau and Whitman. For example, Harold 
Rugg in The Child-Centered School2 grounds his Progressive 
call for self-expression in the poetry of Whitman; and in 
the 1960s pre-writing researchers Gordon Rohman and Albert 
Wlecke— whose pioneering efforts are significant to process 
writing theory which is often considered Emersonian in 
philosophy— -regard Thoreau as foundational to their organic 
theories of writing.
"Natural Continuity": Dewey's Reading of Emerson
Dewey's reading of Emerson is of primary importance to 
the dissemination of Emerson's "organic" voice because 
Dewey's ideas, though often damaged in transit from one 
educator or group to another, were vastly influential.
How, then, did Dewey read Emerson?
In Art as Experience. Dewey uses passages from both W. 
H. Hudson and Emerson to illustrate "the mystic aspect of 
acute esthetic surrender" or "ecstatic communion" of a 
human being with his or her natural surroundings (28-29).
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Hudson tells of a childhood experience having to do with
the effect the "feathery foliage" of acacia trees on
moonlight nights produced in him: " . . .  this tree
seem[ed] more intensely alive than others, more conscious
of me and of my presence" (qtd. in AE 28). Dewey then
couples Hudson's experience with Emerson's account of a
walk he experienced as an adult— a walk which Emerson
describes in one of the best-known passages of Nature:
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at 
twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in 
my thought[s] any occurrence of special good 
fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration.
I am glad to the brink of fear. (qtd. in AE 
28-29)
Dewey concludes that experiences such as these are 
"resonances of dispositions acquired in primitive 
relationships of the living being to its surroundings"—  
dispositions "irrecoverable in distinct or intellectual 
consciousness" (29). What Dewey has taken from Nature is 
Emerson's expression of a longing for an escape from the 
burden of consciousness; this longing becomes apparent when 
one considers the remainder of the passage.
The remaining words— possibly the most famous passage 
in the book-— may actually have better illustrated the 
"mystic" or "ecstatic" communion Dewey wishes to 
demonstrate: the scene is that of Emerson's becoming a
"transparent eyeball." The remainder of the passage- 
beginning immediately after the last sentence Dewey offers 
— is as follows:
14
In the woods, too, a man casts off his years, as 
the snake his slough, and at what period soever 
of life is always a child. In the woods is 
perpetual youth. . . . Standing on the bare 
ground,— my head bathed by the blithe air and 
uplifted into infinite space,-— all mean egotism 
vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball. . . . 
(my emphasis and my ellipses) (Nature 24)
In the final part of the quotation that Dewey has 
cited, Emerson says he is "glad to the brink of fear"; then 
he writes, "in the woods, too, a man casts off his years" 
and "at whatever period soever of life is always a child 
[my emphasis]." He rhapsodizes about "perpetual youth" in 
the woods and about "all mean egotism vanish[ing]" when he 
becomes a "transparent eyeball."
Why, then, is Emerson "glad to the brink of fear" in 
the passage Dewey quotes? Dewey concludes that Emerson's 
joy issues from deposits from a primitive past—
"irrecoverable" in our conscious thinking— a past when 
human beings lived in close relations to their environment: 
he calls this state "natural continuity" (29) . But is the 
source of Emerson's joy revealed in the words that 
immediately follow— those that Dewey omits, those that link 
the two sentences with the transitional word too? For the 
second sentence reveals the joy to be also located— that 
is, as has been the "exhilaration" of the earlier sentence 
quoted by Dewey— in the casting off of his years, in the 
recovery of his innocence, in his enjoyment of "perpetual 
youth," in his savoring the loss of consciousness of self
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— in essence, in Emerson's realizing how "all mean egotism 
vanish[es]" in events such as the ones he has experienced 
in the woods and in crossing the common.
In Emerson's accounts of these two experiences, we see 
what Joseph Kronick refers to as "one of the great themes 
of Romanticism— self-consciousness" (39) ; what anguishes 
the Romantics, says Kronick, is the recognition that human 
beings are forever divided from nature" because 
"perception, the means by which man comes to understand 
nature, severs him from the world . . . .  man dwells in the 
in-between; he belongs to neither the self nor to nature" 
(55). What Emerson perceives is not "continuity" with his 
natural surroundings but an acute consciousness of his 
separation from them: nature is stable, permanent; human
beings are time-bound, mortal.
Childhood, then, offers a shelter from consciousness. 
When Emerson "casts off his years" and accomplishes 
"perpetual youth," he dispenses with the onus of self:
"all mean egotism vanishes" in his contemplation of a time 
before thought, certainly a time before one has thoughts of 
death. Geoffrey Hartman believes the "Romantic poets do 
not exalt consciousness per se. They have recognized it as 
a kind of death-in-life, as the product of a division in 
the self." Childhood and "certain irrevocable moments," 
concludes Hartman, remind the poet that he has "purchased 
with death the life of the mind" ("Romanticism" 303).
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What de Man has argued in "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality" is that the Romantics' use of the symbol to 
express a perceived relationship between human beings and 
nature may be construed as allegory: though symbolic
identification is desired by the poet, allegorical 
difference results. Emerson desires to forget his self- 
consciousness, to see his egotism vanish, to become a 
transparent eyeball; however, his language reveals not 
identity with nature but the difference between 
unselfconscious nature and a time-bound mortal.
Dewey, unlike Emerson, regards language as 
transparent. He argues in Experience and Nature that 
symbolism "is a direct vehicle, a concrete embodiment, a 
vital incarnation" (82). When he sees "natural continuity" 
in Emerson's exhilaration, he subscribes to a symbolic 
theory of language-— one which "would suppose that this 
abyss can be bridged," but, as Kronick argues, "language 
names the void and does not bridge it" (62).
Barbara Packer speaks of the "discouraging arithmetic" 
that reveals the disparity between the "serene and profound 
moments" Emerson speaks of in "Experience"— moments when 
Reason is apprehended (such as the transparent eyeball 
scene) •— and the experience of life "as it presents itself 
to the senses" (129-134). These "visionary moments" 
constitute what Emerson calls his "half a dozen reasonable 
hours" in fifty years (129). What Packer designates as
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Emerson's "visionary moments" and what de Man and Bloom 
have called "moments of peace" and "flashes," Emerson 
documents in his journals and essays again and again with 
words expressing a unity unattained and unattainable.
These moments he describes in Nature as "delicious 
awakenings" (43) ; in journal entries they become "certain 
moments" (62), "a moist, warm, glittering, budding, 
melodious hour" or "a bright hour" (86), "a moment of 
sunshine" (328). In "Experience" the flashes come "for a 
moment" (261) or constitute "only a half-hour" of "angel- 
whispering" (265). Yet these evanescent moments constitute 
the whole of an interpretive tradition— the green American 
tradition— that has defined Emerson for American education.
"Natural continuity" is not represented in the Emerson 
passage Dewey has quoted, and the "ecstatic communion" that 
Dewey reads into it is undercut by Emerson's desire to 
escape from self-consciousness. De Man has written of the 
futility of any attempt to establish unity through 
language:
Critics who speak of a 'happy relationship' 
between matter and consciousness fail to realize 
that the very fact that the relationship has to 
be established within the medium of language
indicates that it does not exist in actuality.
(IS 8)
Thomas Alexander's 1987 study of Dewey's aesthetics3 
demonstrates the importance of the idea of continuity to
Dewey. Continuity, says Alexander, is the core of Dewey's
"metaphysics" and "the underlying idea in Dewey's
conception of 'an experience'" (xvii). Continuity, he 
maintains, eliminates the "mind-body problem" in Dewey and 
"connects naturalism with emergentism" (98). With 
continuity, Alexander argues, the "organic model, so 
important for Dewey from the start of his career, achieves 
mature expression . . . " (99).
And though Alexander does not directly link Dewey's
theory of continuity with either Emerson or "organic
Romanticism," he does not insist, as many Dewey scholars
do, that Dewey's philosophy is unrelated to Romanticism:
Too often is pragmatism understood as fostering a 
spirit inimical to that sponsored by the 
Romantics. Clearly in Dewey's case we see a 
stern attempt to transform many of the ideas of 
romanticism into practicable and realizable 
goals. The romantic dimension of Dewey's thought 
cannot be safely ignored [original emphasis].
(283)
While it is apparent that Alexander sees Dewey as 
transforming Romanticism from the ineffectual or 
unrealizable to the pragmatic, I believe Dewey's aesthetics 
establish not a "romantic dimension" but an organic 
dimension.
In A Common Faith. Dewey addresses the poet's use of
organic synthesis:
The ties binding man to nature that poets have 
always celebrated are passed over lightly. . . .
A religious attitude, however, needs the sense of 
a connection of man, in the way of both 
dependence and support, with the enveloping world 
that the imagination feels is a universe. (53)
Dewey finds worth in the poet's establishing "ties binding 
man to nature" and connecting human beings "with the 
enveloping world." In fact, the faculty by which the 
synthesis is to be accomplished— the imagination— is 
defined by Dewey in Experience and Nature as an "organ of 
nature." He adds, "A purely stable world . . . .  permits 
of no illusion. . . . It just exists" (62). The "romantic 
dimension" of Dewey's aesthetics is not Emersonian but 
organic. When Dewey speaks of symbolic language as a 
"concrete embodiment" and a "vital incarnation" and the 
imagination as an "organ of nature," his words reflect what 
Jonathan Culler has said of organicism: "[It] is not
merely a natural analogue. It is also a theological idea 
. . ." (155).
Hartman has commented that Romantic literature has
a function analogous to that of religion. The 
traditional scheme of Eden, fall, and redemption 
merges with the new triad of nature, self- 
consciousness , imagination: while the last term
in both involves a kind of return to the first.
("Romanticism" 307)
After the fall, the Christian yearns for redemption, which
promises a return to Eden; Hartman, however, states that
the Romantic artist never wishes for a return to nature, or
union with nature (as an organic reading implies) but,
instead, yearns for a recovery of unselfconsciousness, what
Bloom refers to as a recouping of his former "selfless
self" (15-16).
Dewey's veneration of the imagination apparently 
coincides with that of the Romantics; however, there is a 
significant difference. Dewey looks to the imagination to 
supply the tie that binds, that connects. The Romantics 
desire not union with nature but a transcendence of nature: 
"It is the destiny of consciousness, or as the English 
Romantics would have said, of Imagination, to separate from 
nature, so that it can finally transcend not only nature 
but also its own lesser forms [my emphasis]" (Hartman, 
"Romanticism" 301). Dewey's description of imagination, 
like the reading of the Romantics by literary historians 
and the organic textual theories of the New Criticism, is a 
much more theological idea.4 Moreover, his organic 
reading of Emerson is not refuted by educators who followed 
Dewey. In three studies appearing in three different 
decades— from the 1960s to the 1980s— educators evaluated 
Emerson's work as organic.
More Organic Readings: Merging with Roses and Rivers
James Dickinson Grant's 1985 Harvard dissertation 
argues that Dewey not only continued in the tradition of 
Emerson but that Emerson actually influenced Dewey.
He defines Emerson as an organicist whose "integrated" (79) 
and holistic (177) perspective, whose belief in "wholeness" 
and "connection" (133), whose insistence on "connection, 
relation, and continuity" (175) influenced Dewey.
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Important also is Grant's assertion that Emerson 
contributed to Dewey's aesthetics5 (79; 175) with his idea 
that "the aesthetic experience is continuous with common 
experience. . . (175). In other words, Grant argues
that Emerson is, like Dewey, a philosopher who unifies.
The concepts of integration, wholism, connection, 
relation, and continuity frequently appear in organicist, 
not pragmatist, texts. Although Dewey argued that when he 
used words like whole and integration in Art as Experience. 
he used them as they apply to aesthetic experiences and 
•'not to experiences of other kinds" ("Experience" 551) , 
critics accused him of damaging his pragmatism with an 
organic aesthetics.6 The question I raise, however, is 
whether these concepts are used similarly in the works of 
Dewey and Emerson. Grant's thesis requires him to connect 
their philosophies; however, Emerson's philosophy does not 
reflect wholism and unity.
Both Grant and Alexander have stressed the importance 
of the idea of continuity in Deweyan philosophy, and Dewey 
himself calls for a poet's synthesizing imagination in 
making these connections. However, the Romantics know that 
language names the chasm between themselves and nature. If 
they recognize the break as irreversible, have they 
succeeded in establishing the tie connecting humanity and 
nature that Dewey envisions? According to Grant, both 
Emerson and Dewey regard continuity as occurring "through
22
interaction with nature” (96). Thus, Grant must
demonstrate how Emerson acknowledges humanity's connection
with an "enveloping world." He attempts to do so by using
a passage from "Self-Reliance":
These roses under my window make no reference to 
former roses or to better ones; they are for what 
they are; they exist with God to-day. There is 
no time to them. There is simply the rose; it is 
perfect in every moment of its existence. . . . 
But man postpones or remembers; he does not live 
in the present, but with reverted eye laments the 
past, or, heedless of the riches that surround 
him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future. He 
cannot be happy and strong until he too lives 
with nature in the present, above time. (qtd. in 
Grant 75)
Grant reads this passage as a reflection of Emerson's 
belief (shared with Dewey) that "life is essentially 
experience" and that the "fullest possible experience is 
marked by full integration of organism and environment," 
the "indication of this full integration" being the 
"ability to live fully in the present . . . "  (75). Hence, 
Grant uses this passage to join Dewey's call for 
integrating the human being with the "enveloping world" 
with what he considers to be similar organic sentiments in 
Emerson. However, Grant misreads Emerson. What Emerson 
says in the passage is not symbolic; there is no identity, 
only difference. The human being is self-conscious, 
mortal— in short, is becoming. The rose, however, is. De 
Man would say of the rose, " . . .  existence and essence 
coincide" (IS 4). Grant omits the two sentences that open 
the rose passage and elides two sentences appearing in the
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middle of the passage; they appear below in the order I 
have named:
Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer 
upright; he dares not say 'I think,' 'I am,' but 
quotes some saint or sage. He is ashamed before 
the blade of grass or the blowing rose.
• • • o
Before a leaf bud has burst, its whole life acts; 
in the full-blown flower there is no more; in the 
leafless root there is no less. Its nature is 
satisfied and its satisfies nature in all moments 
alike. (SR 157)
Grant reads the rose passage as an endorsement of 
living "fully in the present," (75); Emerson, however, 
questions whether postponing, remembering, tiptoeing human 
beings can ever secure the satisfied stability of the rose 
living "above time." Grant has proposed ”full integration 
of organism and environment” as a condition for living 
fully in the present; however, Emerson's words reflect no 
integration of the rose and the human being. Grant 
confuses Emerson's privileging of the present moment with a 
spatializing self-presence. In "Self-Reliance" Emerson 
says, "This one fact the world hates; that the soul 
becomes: for that forever degrades the past . . . "  (158). 
What he acknowledges in this statement is that human beings 
are bound by time. In privileging the present moment, 
Emerson makes an ontological, not an organic, assertion.
In misreading the rose passage, Grant erroneously credits 
Emerson with having established what Dewey endorses: "ties 
binding man to nature."
In the rose passage Emerson grapples with the temporal 
dilemma of the human being who cannot be buoyed by the 
thought of a correlation between the "satisfied" rose-—  
"perfect in every moment of its existence"-— and the human 
being who cannot emulate this essence. The rose lives 
"with nature in the present, above time." Language, or 
self-consciousness, lets the human being think the 
difference; the rose is, as Whitman in "Song of Myself" 
says of unselfconscious animals, "placid and self- 
contained. "
Emerson's rose expresses fully the Romantic sense of 
estrangement: the rose is; the human being is becoming.
Friedrich Schlegel represents Romanticism as "an eternal 
'becoming' that has as its chief characteristic that it 
'nie vollendet sein kann'— can never be completed (qtd. in 
McFarland, 13). The rose is complete, placid, self- 
contained. Human beings feel incomplete and fragmented. 
Emerson says in "Experience": "I know better than to claim
any completeness for my picture. I am a fragment, and this 
is a fragment of me" (272). Thomas McFarland sees this 
incompleteness and fragmentation as constitutive of 
Romanticism (7), and he suggests that the Romantic 
preoccupation with infinity as a solution to problems of 
temporality is accompanied, paradoxically enough, by the 
poet's perception of parts-— fragments that can only hint at 
"the hypothetical wholeness of infinity" (28-29). The
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fragmentation and the parts, says McFarland, are the 
reality.
Emerson's work is replete with statements reflecting 
the distinction our minds make between our own feeling of 
fragmentation and the stability of infinite nature; the 
problem, he reasons, is our self-consciousness. In 
Emerson, images of binding, belting, strapping, and girding 
reveal the human condition; on the other hand, images of 
fluidity and vigor characterize the infinity of nature.
His essays and journals declare the human desire for 
liberty— "freedom boundless I wish" ("Journals" 137)— but 
they also reveal the reality of "a strap or belt which 
girds the world" ("Fate" 46)— a "bounded world, bounded 
everywhere— all immoveably bounded, no liquidity of hope or 
genius" ("Journals" 329).
He represents self-consciousness as the problem:
But the man is as it were clapped into jail 
by his consciousness. . . . Ah, that he 
could pass again into his neutrality! Who 
can thus avoid all pledges and, having 
observed, observe again from the same 
unaffected, unbiased, unbribable, 
unaffrighted innocence,— must always be 
formidable. . . . (SR 149)
The alienation arises from thought, but Emerson's only
remedy for what Hegel calls man's "unhappy consciousness"
is to "pass again into his neutrality," that is, to return
to an unselfconscious state of childhood. Of course,
Emerson realizes this to be no legitimate alternative.
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Elsewhere he says, "Every thought is also a prison. .
. . "; however, he proposes that the poet might "unlock our
chains” and provide "emancipation” with "a new thought”
coming from "greater depth” ("Poet" 36). The new poet that
Emerson proposes, he concedes that he has not found, for
"Time and nature yield us many gifts, but not yet the
timely man, the new religion, the reconciler, whom all
things await" (238). While Emerson has not found the
"timely man” or the "reconciler,” his search for freedom
from thought is a Romantic refrain. Bloom has shown the
objective of the search not to be that which traditional
criticism has proposed— the poet's uniting of self and
nature— -but a recovery of unselfconsciousness. The
Romantic poet was, according to Bloom, a
seeker not after nature but after his own mature 
powers, and so [he] turned away, not from society
to nature, but from nature to what was more
integral than nature, within himself. The 
widened consciousness of the poet did not give 
him intimations of a former union with nature or 
the Divine, but rather of his former selfless 
self. (15-16)
McFarland contrasts the Romantics' reality of 
fragmentation with their attraction to infinity; that 
attraction, he says, is often represented by the ocean as 
infinity and by the stream as a symbol of process (28). In 
"Experience," Emerson struggles to name "the sentiment from 
which it [consciousness] sprung, to name "this unbounded 
substance." He writes that the word "Being" is as close as
we can come to naming the "ineffable cause": ". . . we
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have arrived as far as we can go. Suffice it for the joy 
of the universe that we have not arrived at a wall, but at 
interminable oceans” (268).
Grant's use of the rose to explain Emerson's 
compulsion to connect typifies education's interpretation 
of the Romantics. At times the misreading has come from an 
educator's incomplete grasp of the texts; at other times, 
educators have listened to the voices of literary 
historians and critics. But the characterizations of 
Emerson as an organic philosopher are the standard, not 
the exception.
In his 1972 study, Richard Welke Cass attempts to 
plumb Emerson's work for its implications in reforming 
curriculum. He says the . . correspondence between mind 
and matter, subject and object, physical laws and moral 
laws is for Emerson the key to knowledge and the basis for 
knowing" (54). Emerson, in Cass's interpretation, becomes 
a reconciler of epistemological dualisms: "Emerson's 
theory of knowledge, then, is more than either cognitive or 
blind faith [;] it is a unification of rational cognition 
with intuitive perception" (113).7
To illustrate his own organic conception of 
curriculum, Cass draws an extensive analogy between 
Emerson's view of the human mind and the natural 
characteristics of the Mississippi River— a symbolic
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rendering inspired, or so he apparently believes, by the
organic ideas of Emerson:
The mind Emerson sees in man metaphorically 
resembles a mighty river, one like Twain's 
Mississippi, perhaps. Like this river, man's 
thought draws from an enormous watershed for its 
ever appearing and always renewed substance.
• • • •
Like this Mississippi, then, Emerson's conception 
resembles the river's ceaseless process of 
skillfully going somewhere by being broad but by 
also being defined. . . [man] must be able to 
know intuitively, see generally, and refocus to 
the horizon. Man's knowing, then, must be a 
three-dimensional matrix of broad and deep 
movements. (149-151)
In the Cass interpretation, Emerson offers organic
synthesis of intuitive and cognitive ways of knowing in a
"ceaseless process," which is both "broad" and "defined."
Emerson, however, sees division, not synthesis. Cass's
reading of Emerson as a wholistic philosopher exhibits
strands of New Critical organicism. Though he does not
acknowledge the New Criticism's attack on Romanticism, he
does apply a New Critical apparatus. Cass uses T. S.
Eliot's objective correlative in reading Emerson's "The
Over-Soul":
The pattern and movement of the essay reproduces 
something of the pattern by which the Over-Soul 
functions in man. Hence the essay, itself, 
becomes the objective correlative of the working 
of the Over-Soul, a concept which the essay is 
simultaneously trying discursively to define. 
(23-24)
Not only does Cass read Emerson as a reconciler, but he 
also sees, New Critically, an organic totality of effect in 
the Emerson essay.
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Like Dewey and Grant, Cass attributes to Emerson 
powers of synthesis and reconciliation which Emerson 
himself desires but never achieves. Emerson records in his 
journal:
The bread which we ask of Nature is that she 
should entrance us, but amidst her beautiful or 
her grandest pictures I cannot escape the second 
thought. I walked this P. M. in the woods, but 
there too the snowbanks were sprinkled with 
tobacco-juice. We have the wish to forget night 
and day, father and mother, food and ambition, 
but we never lose our dualism [original 
emphasis]. (275)
Perhaps the most extravagant claim made for Emerson's
unifying powers and the application of those powers to
education appears in Rena Lee Williams Foy's "The
Philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Its Educational
Implications" (1962). Foy reads Emerson as an idealist.
As a result, she transcendentalizes the curriculum she
proposes. As Cass had drawn epistemological implications
from "the ceaseless process" of the Emersonian Mississippi
River, Foy wishes to stamp curriculum with Emersonian
eternal processes of "striving" and "advancing" toward what
she theocritically terms "ascension":
Throughout the writings of Emerson, there is 
affirmed an unwavering faith in a universal order 
of things, the order is not static, but each 
component part is striving for ascension— to the 
One, the Great Unity. (9)
The concern with parts-to-whole relationships issues from
the reality of the Romantics' fragmented being, but the
Romantic emphasis, according to McFarland, always falls on
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the parts. Foy, however, believes Emerson has transcended
the dualisms, and she metaphysically focuses on the Whole,
the One, the Great Unity. Since component parts of the
Emersonian doctrine are "striving for ascension," then the
Foy-informed classroom will duplicate this process:
Since all diversity at last blends into unity, 
the student’s progress should be marked by 
increasing ability to organize, classify, relate, 
and synthesize. The sequence is from the 
learning of facts to philosophy. (354)
Foy also applies unity to the study of morals; nature, she
says, provides the model for moral instruction:
"The teaching of the ascension process gives the child a
sense of being caught up on an advancing continuum . . . "
(343). Foy's reading of Emerson is, in short, organic and
theological.
Emersonian Process Writing
Winifred Horner has shown that until quite recently 
composition research has largely been accomplished by 
schools of education, not by departments of English (6), 
and James Berlin has said the history of composition is 
"closely related" to the history of American education (RR 
1). Not surprisingly, then, "Romantic" rhetoricians, often 
educators or researchers working closely with educational 
theorists, adopt an organic reading of Emerson.
John Willinsky explains writing as a "method of 
connecting, of integrating the learner into what is to be
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learned. . . " (NL 56), and he bases his organic theories 
of process8 writing on British Romanticism; however, his 
research also draws heavily from American sources. Though 
Willinsky does not specifically cite Emerson as a Romantic 
source for his New Literacy, other American process 
theorists do. In fact, within process pedagogy, both 
expressionistic and transactional theorists specify Emerson 
as forebear.
Berlin has graphed movements within composition 
pedagogy in American colleges through both nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century manifestations. An epistemic 
transactionalist, he grounds his own theories in the 
democratic, social, communal aspects of Emerson. However, 
Berlin readily acknowledges that Emerson is claimed by 
expressionists who see him in a very different way: as an
individualist concerned with self-expression. Although 
these two groups have conflicting aims, each looks to 
Emerson as foundational. Stranger still, each reads him 
similarly: as an organicist.
In his history of nineteenth-century rhetoric,
Berlin's chapter on "Emerson and Romantic Rhetoric" claims 
Emerson for the transactionalists. And though Mark Wiley's 
essay interpreting the work of two leading expressionists—  
Peter Elbow and Donald Bartholomae9— designates Emerson an 
expressionist, a common ground does emerge in the two 
interpretations: an organic and metaphysical reading of
32
Emerson. Both Berlin's and Wiley's process theories 
emphasize a symbolic view of language. This view, the 
Coleridgean position, has been defined by Ann Berthoff as 
mind and nature "shar[ing] with nature an organic 
character— an essentially active, growing, developing, 
transforming power” (59). This symbolic, Coleridgean 
position also defines Willinksy's position on process 
writing:
The process model of writing would seem to 
provide a clear instance of Coleridge's 
'blending, fusing' powers of the imagination to 
the classroom. In the process model, the teacher 
ensures that the student's writing takes on a 
development of its own . . . .  until it achieves 
a kind of organic independence. (”Seldom” 274)
Like Willinsky, American theorists embrace organicism, but
they most frequently use Emerson rather than the British
Romantics as a model.
Berlin's argument that language is the key to 
Emerson's epistemology is one that I have also advanced, 
but Berlin sees a different Emerson, one who “locates the 
real in the fusion of the sensual and ideal” and who says 
"knowledge is possible only in the interaction of the two" 
(46). This is, of course, Emerson as symbol-maker, 
reconciler, and uniter. According to Berlin, it is 
Emerson's use of metaphor that establishes a "point of 
intersection between outside and inside” (48).
Berlin says Emerson believes that nature supplies us 
with the language through which our sense perceptions of
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the material world can express the ideal (48). In Berlin's
interpretation of Emerson, then, sense perceptions link
human beings to nature. Joseph Kronick has spoken of
Emerson's concern with "the medium of perception."
According to Kronick, "Emejrson's use of the word perception
. . . is indistinguishable from the concept of mediation."
Perception, in other words, does not link the subject and
object; it mediates. Kronick continues, "What concerns
Emerson is the medium of perception; we can never see the
thing-in-itself because the medium of the senses intervenes
between self and object [original emphasis]" (55) . Emerson
says, "This slight discontinuity which perception effects
between mind and the object paralyzes the will" (qtd. in
Kronick 55). In Emerson's view, then, perception does not
link material nature and the ideal but intervenes between
self and object.
In "The Poet" Emerson does not find the making of
metaphor a "natural" thing:
For poetry was all written before time was, and 
whenever we are so finely organized that we can 
penetrate into that region where the air is 
music, we hear those primal warblings and attempt 
to write them down, but we lose ever and anon a 
word or a verse and substitute something of our 
own, and thus miswrite the poem. (224)
The necessity of "substitut[ing] something of our own,"
Emerson believes, is due to the discontinuity existing
between nature and the poet:
Language is fossil poetry. . . . so language is made 
up of images or tropes, which now in their secondary
34
use, have long ceased to remind us of their poetic
origin [my emphasis]. ("Poet" 231)
As Kronick tells us, "Language does not link mind and 
nature, for nature has its own visual grammar, and 
intellect must borrow a language [my emphasis]" (61). 
Kronick indicates that Emerson is well aware of the 
inadequacy of symbolic language; instead of "bridg[ing] the 
gap between subject and object," Emerson looks on language 
as "creat[ing] the abyss wherever it appears" (61).
Berlin, however, believes Emerson endorses the "use of 
metaphor. . . as the paradigm for all language use" (48).
He reads Emerson as indicating that " [s]ubject and object 
have meaning only in the creation of the unifying symbol" 
(48). Because of his own belief in the social and 
transactional uses of writing, Berlin looks for the social 
in Emerson; he says Emerson "spells out [language's ] role 
in public discourse. . . . [Itl must be metaphoric" (51).
In Berlin's analysis Emerson seems to imply that metaphoric 
language is to be called up only as an act of will;
Emerson, however, recognizes figuration as integral to 
language: language is "fossil poetry" made up of images
and tropes "now in their secondary uses." Language is, 
then, "always figurative through and through" (Miller 48). 
According to Berlin's perception of Emerson, the writer 
achieves a "metaphoric display" only after concrete 
experience and the idea have been united; thus he
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interprets Emerson as insisting on the importance of 
"contact with all of a language's resources" (52).
Emerson says language decays and "old words are 
perverted to stand for things which are not; a paper 
currency is employed, when there is no bullion in the 
vaults . . . "  (qtd. in Berlin 52). But Berlin interprets 
Emerson's dissatisfaction with the capacity of language to 
represent reality as an exhortation for writers to create 
fresh metaphors to express truth. He reads Emerson as 
endorsing a "fresh union of object and idea" so that these 
new metaphors might express truth (52-53).
Berlin has misread Emerson. He sums up Emerson's
influence on process rhetoric with these words:
Emerson's rhetoric, not restricted to securing a 
desired effect on the audience, was attempting to 
restore the search for truth to the composing 
act. Truth, moreover, is organic, is a holistic 
product growing out of the entire rhetorical 
situation— reality, speaker, listener, and 
language. All are involved in discovery and each 
changes in response to each. (WI 57)
Finally, Berlin says, " . . .  one does not have to be a
philosophical idealist to see reality as the convergence of
perceiver and perceived with language as the agent of
mediation" (57) . With an organic interpretat ion of
Emerson's language philosophy at its base, Berlin's
transactional theory insists on the convergence of subject
and object through language. In this insistence on
language as a vehicle of union, Berlin subscribes to what
Derrida calls the "metaphysics of presence." Sharon
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Crowley has explained this relationship of language,
consciousness, and the world:
. . . by a kind of doubling movement, the 
relation of signification that exists between 
voice and mind is transferred to the relation of 
minds to nature. In other words, the metaphysics 
of presence assumes two sets of similar 
relations: as minds represent or signify the
substances of nature, so does language represent 
or signify the 'stuff' of minds, and through 
this, nature. . . . Thus traditional metaphysics 
constructed a self-sealing argument regarding the 
representative relationships that exist between 
minds, the world, and language. (3)
Mark Wiley's attaching of expressionistic theory to 
Emerson's thought focuses not on the social, democratic 
aspects of Emerson that Berlin stresses but on Emerson's 
individualism: Wiley represents his subjects— Elbow and
Bartholomae— as theorists who argue for student 
empowerment. Wiley says the two compositionists help 
students gain "real voice" by encouraging them to resist 
authority; they are to do this by making language their 
own. Once again, a critic speaks of language as a tool, as 
a medium of communication; Emerson, however, expresses 
doubts as to the capacity of language to make thought 
phenomenal.
Wiley says, "Elbow's trope of real voice resonates
with . . . Emerson's belief that our words originate from
things" (59). However, he, in the doubling movement
Crowley has described, maintains that Emerson
desires the things themselves to speak through a 
language generated through intellectual acts 
focused on their experiences. Language is used
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by a person to get bevond words in order to 
reconnect oneself with the world [my emphasis]. 
(59)
This idea of getting beyond words to reconnect oneself 
with the world is not Emersonian: Emerson recognizes the
split between signifier and signified, between subject and 
object. Adopting the "right" word, Wiley says, may aid a 
writer insofar as "the relationship between self and 
objects in the world is revealed through the proper use of 
language" (59). Once again, the interpretation is language 
as a tool, a way of accessing reality; and once again, the 
reading is organic: words will aid in reconnecting oneself
with the world. Wiley interprets expressionism as 
encouraging writers "to get beyond words" in making these 
connections.10
Eager to relieve the expressionists from the charge 
that they are excessively subjective, even solipsistic, 
he declares real voice to signify "a special type of social 
entity"; peer response groups become "small, closed 
communities." While striving for real voice is still 
theoretically an "individual activity," it is "carried out 
in a public sphere; hence, it is simultaneously personal 
and transpersonal, and in a wide sense, religious in 
nature." Individuals strive to "realize a power within, 
which, when manifested, transcends the individual and 
unites the group" (61). This "power within" issues from 
what Wiley calls "the Emersonian imperative for each person
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to seek the 'God within.'” He suggests this power might be 
called the unconscious, the soul, or instinct but that its 
function is "to reunite the person with the world” (61).
The function of the "power within" is, in Wiley's 
rendering, a mystical, organic unifying of the person with 
the world.
Debrah Raschke— -a transactional theorist— -regards the 
"real voice" of expressionist rhetoric as a Romanticism 
perilously close to solipsism-— the indictment Wiley seems 
aware of when he speaks of expressionist peer editing as 
social, public, communal. Raschke regards the 
expressionist self as "a self beyond language," one 
"created away from and without dialogue with the rest of 
society." And Raschke regards the expressionists' use of 
peer editing as "subtly reinfore[ing] this personal 
landscape" (6). More significant than her interpretation 
of Emerson as the cornerstone of expressionism is her 
misreading of Emerson. She interprets him as endorsing the 
idea that language is "neutral and pure," and she 
characterizes him as unifying the Not Me and Me, "turning 
all of it into a mirror of his own mind." Emerson, she 
says, "essentially denies difference, denies the dialectic 
by making it all a unified whole contained within the human 
mind" (9-10). Raschke obviously wishes to place Emerson 
in the expressionist group Wiley has characterized. To do 
so, she misreads both Emerson's theory of language (she
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sees him as a symbolist) and his message of unity. She too 
reads him as organic.
Two different Emersons emerge from the
transactiona1ist and expressionist uses of Emerson;
however, the two schools are one in their organic reading
of Emerson. With their emphasis on (or ambivalence about)
an interpretive community,11 what the two schools reflect
is the tension Gregory Desilet has seen between what he
labels as "rhetoric” and as "communication.” He says the
compositionists who stress communication as establishing
"shared meaning" through a community of interpreters is a
hermeneutic position that is metaphysical:
. . . hermeneutics retains the key feature of 
metaphysical orientations: concealed preference.
Hermeneutics leans to one side of the 
same/different opposition in the ease with which 
it assumes communication, as the sharing of 
meaning, to be pervasive in the use of language. 
This choice privileges the sameness of 
intersubjectivity in the self/other relation, 
thereby upsetting the balance in the 
individual/collective relation. (153)
This is Berlin's epistemic (transactional) position, one
that places great emphasis on the intersubjective and
social contexts of communication while at the same time
rejecting the expressionists for their individual or
private visions. "Acceptance by a consensus of others
becomes the basic criterion for what counts as knowledge"
in Desilet's interpretation of hermeneutic communication
(156). In privileging collective over individual
interpretation, Desilet says, "communication" shows its
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metaphysical mooring. On the other hand, "rhetoric," as 
Desilet distinguishes it, "conveys the stimulation and 
provocation of meaning with the additional advantage of 
neither implying nor precluding shared meaning" (169).
This view, he says, is represented by Derridean post- 
structural i sm.
Desilet cites the work of Steven Mailloux, who has 
distinguished two hermeneutics: first, "hermeneutic
realism," in which "meanings are discovered, not created," 
with texts determining interpretation and, second, 
"hermeneutic idealism," in which "meaning is made, not 
found," with communal interpretation creating the text 
(qtd. in Desilet 174). Hermeneutic idealism is the 
description which best characterizes what Desilet sees in 
the hermeneutic emphasis on "shared meaning."
Berlin's pedgogy requires shared, communal 
interpretation. In this, in his misreading of Emerson's 
understanding of language,12 and in his view of Emerson as 
organicist, Berlin reflects a philosophy with metaphysical 
shadings. In his attempt to secure Emerson for social, 
epistemic composition theory, Berlin must deny Emerson's 
subjectivity while at the same time privileging what he 
views as Emerson's symbolic theory of language. Though 
Berlin and Wiley see in Emerson a foundation for 
conflicting rhetorical theories, they hold in common the 
notion of an Emerson with powers of reconciliation.
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Sources of an Organic Emerson
What is the explanation for the organic interpretation 
of Emerson that pervades education? Even the 
interpretation that seems to issue from an educator's own 
careless reading possibly has been prompted by two powerful 
sources that he or she is perhaps unaware of: literary
historians and the New Criticism. Jasper Neel tells of the 
omnipresent authority of the New Criticism and Northrop 
Frye's myth criticism: "These two systems led to tens of
thousands of articles and books explaining the true meaning 
of each poem, play, and novel in the Anglo-American 
tradition” (57). The critical interpretations of these 
authoritative voices have provided a base for studies in 
English for generations. Sharon Crowley reveals how M. H. 
Abrams assumed "an authoritative reading” for a piece of 
literature— -"a reading which would put a stop to all other 
readings and which would, then, not itself be readable 
(that is, open to criticism)" (20). These critical 
interpretations foster the single best meaning while 
restraining others. The result is an interpretation that 
would, in Crowley's words, "put a stop" to other 
interpretations.
These "authoritative" readings of the Romantics 
produced a single way of regarding the Romantics: as
organicists who wished to reconcile self and nature. In 
1962 a Rene Wellek essay was published in an edition which
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Frye edited and titled Romanticism Reconsidered. In his 
essay Wellek gives a synoptic survey of German, French, and 
American Romantic criticism of the twentieth century; he 
finds almost univocal agreement.
He says that a "neglected" German work advances the
"once central and valid concept: the reconciling,
synthetic imagination as the common denominator of
Romanticism" (113). He credits Morse Peckham for "singling
out the criterion of 'organic dynamism' as the definition
of Romanticism" (109). He commends Beguin's "understanding
of the nature of the Romantic imagination and its
rootedness in a sense of the continuity between man and
nature and the presence of God" (121), and he finds
Poulet's evaluation of "all Romanticism" wisely summarized
as an "effort to overcome the oppositon of subject and
object . . . "  (122). Abrams, he credits with having
established "the chief theme of continuity. . . in many
important Romantic poems" (125), and he commends Wilson
Knight for having come "to the right conclusion that
Wordsworth aims at a 'fusion of mind with nature to create
a living paradise . . .'" (127). Finally, Wellek
summarizes the collective, monolithic wisdom of decades of
Romantic theorizing:
In all of these studies, however diverse in 
method and emphasis, a convincing agreement has 
been reached: they all see the implication of
imagination, symbol, myth, and organic nature, 
and see it as part of the great endeavor to 
overcome the split between subject and object,
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the self and the world, the conscious and the 
unconscious. This is the central creed of the 
great Romantic poets in England, Germany, and 
France. It is a closely coherent body of thought 
and feeling. (131-32)
T. S. Eliot, leading theorist of the New Criticism, 
argued for the transparency of poetic language: "Language
in a healthy state presents the object, is so close to the 
object that the two are identified" (qtd. in Waters, xliv). 
The Eliot position is the symbolic or organic position that 
educators have themselves seen, or have had represented to 
them, as being characteristic of Romantic literature.
Eliot's idea that language reflects the object so closely 
that the two are one is organic and, as Waters says, 
revealing of "an ontological compulsion": the literary
symbol accesses reality (il).
Catherine Belsey has pointed out the weakness of the
idea that words "inhere timelessly in the phenomenal world
or in the continuity of essential human nature." With
words inhering timelessly, the meaning of a piece of
literature, once determined, becomes petrified. What the
New Critics failed to acknowledge, Belsey says, is that
language . . . provides the possibility of 
meaning, but because language is not static but 
perpetually in process, what is inherent in the 
text is a range of possibilities of meaning. .
. . Meanings are not fixed or given, but are 
released in the process of reading. . . (20).
Paradoxically, while New Critical theorists castigated, on
the one hand, Romantic subjectivity— the way the Romantics
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pondered separation and wholeness— they, on the other hand, 
espoused the symbol and organic form.
It is no wonder that education has failed to recognize 
that the significant legacy of the Romantics is their 
concern with language and consciousness and not organic 
unity. This reduction of Romanticism to organicism13 has 
prompted educators to define wholism, unity, 
reconciliation, synthesis, and other components of 
organicism as "Romantic.”
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. Allusions to Emerson and the affinity of his thought 
with both Progressivism and pragmatism are abundant.
He is commonly presented as an organic philosopher of 
unity and wholism.
Interpretations link him to the educational, 
political, and social aspects of Progressivism. For 
example, Daniel Aaron calls him "the real prophet of the 
progressive tradition" (Men of Good Hope: A Storv of
American Progressives, p. 7). Daniel H. Peck identifies 
Emerson as the inspiration for the Progressive "insurgence" 
in anthropo1ogy (Veblen), architecture (Sullivan) and 
education (Dewey) at the turn of the century in the city of 
Chicago; in the same book— The Green American Tradition; 
Essavs and Poems for Sherman Paul-— Hugh Dawson points out 
correspondences between Emerson and Whitman's organic 
philosophy and Louis Sullivan's views on both architecture 
and education (see pp. 2; 6-7; 100-108). See also John F. 
Roche's "Building for Democracy: Organic Architecture in
Relation to Progressive Education." Roche connects 
Chicago's "Organic Architecture" and Sullivan and Frank 
Lloyd Wright with "the Romantic theory of organicism" (p. 
298); Dewey, he says, drew the respect of both Sullivan and 
Wright, both of whom were passionate advocates of "radical 
change in education" (p. 305). See also Lauren S.
Weingarden's Louis Sullivan: The Banks. Weingarden
specifically refers to Sullivan's inheritance of the 
"symbol-making project" from Whitman and Emerson (p. 7).
Emerson is also considered a progenitor of 
educational progressivism and American pragmatism. James 
Dickinson Grant has called Emerson "an important forerunner 
of progressive education in the United States" (p. 2) and 
"the father of the distinctly American tradition of 
philosophy" (185) ("Ralph Waldo Emerson and John Dewey: A
Study of Intellectual Continuities and Influence"). And 
Cornel West has said Emerson is "the appropriate starting 
point for the pragmatists' tradition" (The American Evasion 
of Philosophy, p. 6). In a 1943 study, Albert E. Lewis 
says, "Regardless of terminology, Emerson stands at the 
fork of the road which leads on to Dewey and Kilpatrick and 
the progressive movement of today" ("The Contributions of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson to American Education," p. 168). Denis 
Donoghue describes Emersonian thought as a precursor of 
pragmatism (Emerson and His Legacy, pp. 26-27). See also 
Howard Mumford Jones, who has collected Emerson's work on 
education and who points out elements of progressivism in 
Emerson's educational philosophy (Emerson on Education, pp. 
19-20).
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2. Ann Shumaker is listed as a co-author of The Child- 
Centered School? however, in future references I will use 
Rugg alone (one wonders whether Shumaker served in a 
research capacity in this endeavor; the style appears to be 
pure Rugg).
3. Dewey's aesthetics, not his instrumenta1ism, is central 
to my study of his organicism. Alexander, however, argues 
that "the central guiding thought" in Dewey's philosophy is 
the "aesthetic dimension of experience" (p. xiii) and that 
the "aesthetic experience . . . is an inherent possibility 
of most experience" (p. 6). "What was needed most of all,11 
says Alexander, "was an analysis of the relationship 
between his description of aesthetic experience and his 
instrumenta1ism" (184). Positing that experience 
"underlies both aspects of his philosophy," Alexander 
believes "the fundamental condition for instrumentalism is 
that experience is capable of integrated fulfillment which 
is the result of intelligently directed human activity" (p. 
184) .
4. I make no attempt to characterize Dewey's religious 
beliefs when I associate organicism with theology. James 
Dickinson Grant quotes Dewey as having said in a letter to 
Joseph Ratner that his antipathy to dualism was emotional, 
not religious. Grant concludes that the base of religious 
belief in Dewey and Emerson was similar: "But there is 
clearly an affinity of religious spirit between the two 
men— both men associate religious experience with a sense 
of broad connection between man and nature" (p. 80).
5. Grant studied the underlined passages and marginal 
notations Dewey made in his personal copies of Emerson's 
works; he also read the class notes Edwin Peck took in the 
course on English and American transcendentalism Dewey 
taught in 1892. Peck recorded these remarks of Dewey's : 
"Emerson saw clearly the absurdity of making art a thing in 
itself, more than almost any other man. Art is a vehicle. 
To get this one idea well from Emerson is worth reading 
several of his essays through. . . " (see Grant, p. 80).
6. Alexander has given comprehensive treatment to what he
calls the "Pepper-Croce Thesis"; see the introduction to 
John Dewev's Theory of Art. Experience, and Nature: The 
Horizons of Feeling; also see chapter two. Pepper 
pronounced Art as Experience organistic and argued that an
"organistic esthetics cannot be harmonized with a pragmatic 
esthetics" (see "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics," p.
372). Others called Art as Experience "romantic"
(Campbell, p. 85); "idealistic" (Piatt 108; Kazin 143) and
"organicist (Campbell 85; Jeannot 267). D. C. Phillips 
believes Dewey's philosophy has all the characteristics of
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the five components he names as essential to organicism. 
Although he does not associate Dewey's organicism with 
Romantic literature (he believes evolutionary biology and 
Hegel were sources), he does maintain that organicism is 
Dewey's "root metaphor" (see Phillips' "John Dewey and the 
Organismic Archetype," pp. 232-271).
7. Kieran Egan's 1990 study, Romantic Understanding: The 
Development of Rationality and Imagination. Ages 8-15. is 
suggestive of Cass's use of Emerson as a reconciler of 
intuitive and cognitive ways of knowing. Though Egan 
revises turn-of-the-century recapitulation theory, his 
models are the British Romantics and Alfred North 
Whitehead. Representing "modern educational thought at its 
best as merely footnotes to Wordsworth" (286), Egan calls 
on a Romantic model for reconciling knowledge accumulation 
and psychological development. Egan views the Romantic 
achievement as being one of "discovering a key to harmony 
and balance in our cultural lives" (82). See also Harriet 
Scott's recapitulation theory of curriculum in Organic 
Education (1899). Scott's new curriculum is described as 
having "branches of study" springing "from the same trunk
(p. 8).
8. What constitutes "process" rhetoric is currently 
being debated in research discourse. Its opposite is 
product-oriented pedagogy, often described as "current- 
traditional." Generally, process theorists describe 
writing as a process of discovery.
Andrea Lunsford and Robert Connors (The St. Martin's 
Handbook) define process writing as "seamless and 
recursive, meaning that its goals or parts are constantly 
flowing into and influencing one another, without any clear 
break between them" (p. 2). Lunsford and Connors, as do 
many process theorists, disdain clearly defined prewriting, 
writing, revising "steps," saying that writing, instead, 
takes place "simultaneously, in a kind of spiraling 
sequence" of "exploring, drafting, and revising all taking 
place throughout the process of writing" (p. 2).
Though process theorists Maxine Hairston and John 
Ruszkiewicz advise students not to think of the final 
product, they, unlike Lunsford and Connors, do envision 
steps and stages, advising students of the "smaller steps 
you can take to pull off that finished product," for 
"writing. . . is a process that moves through stages."
Their "process menu" includes preparing, planning, 
drafting, incubating, revising, editing, and proofreading 
(The Scott. Foresman Handbook for Writers, p. 5).
The historiographer of two NCTE-published studies of 
rhetoric, James Berlin has outlined two major schools of 
twentieth-century process composition: subjective
and transactional. According to Berlin, subjective 
rhetoric— represented by expressionism-— locates reality 
within the individual and transactional— -represented by 
classical, cognitive, and epistemic pedagogies— locates 
reality in the transaction between the observer and the 
observed (between the private and the social); see Rhetoric 
and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges.
1900-1985. pp. 145-179.
9. These designations oscillate, both with writers 
themselves declaring an alteration in theory or with 
critics contending among themselves as to the correctness 
of a classification. In Rhetoric and Reality Berlin says 
Bartholomae "has recently moved firmly into the ranks of 
the epistemic category" (p. 185).
10. Bob Morgan calls the kind of plea Wiley makes to "get 
beyond words" the "bleached language" or "correspondence" 
theory of language. Language is transparent: it "conveys 
the presence of the world to us"; there is "a one-to-one 
correspondence between the objects in the world, the words 
in a language, and the concepts in our heads" ("Three 
Dreams of Language; Or, No Longer Immured in the Bastille 
of the Humanist Word," p. 450).
11. The transactional has at its theoretical base the 
importance of writing as a transaction between the writer 
and his or her social environment, between the private and 
the public. Berlin says expressionists ground their theory 
in private discovery; for them, he says, reality is "a 
personal and private construction" (p. 145).
12. I do not wish to misconstrue the Berlin position. In 
his later volume on the history of twentieth-century 
composition, he speaks of language not being a "simple sign 
system" and of language "being the very condition that 
makes thought possible" (p. 48). However, in his 
characterization of Emerson, Berlin adopts an organicist 
position; in other parts of this earlier text, he also 
endorses the use of organic metaphors to describe the 
composing process (p. 83).
13. See Morse Peckham, The Triumph of Romanticism: 
Collected Essays, pp. 12-13; see also Peter L. Thorslev, 
Romantic Contraries; Freedom and Destiny, p. 85.
Peckham reduces the three components A. J. Lovejoy and 
Wellek have defined as "Romantic" to one— organicism— and 
Thorslev says organicism is Romanticism's "most
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distinctive" hallmark. These writers, of course, fall 
into the pattern of traditional Romantic criticism.
CHAPTER 3 
THE LANGUAGE OF REFORM
In reform tracts of the twentieth century, educators 
have attempted to mend division, separation, and alienation 
with wholeness, connection, and integration; in expressing 
the division, theorists have used mechanistic metaphors 
which associate educational problems with technology, 
construction, production, and confinement; in proposing 
reform, they have used organic metaphors which symbolically 
identify their reform with nature. While the idea of the 
whole as being especially desirable is as old as thought1 
and the valuing of the thing "grown" over the thing "made" 
(Williams 37) is a distinction which Leo Marx says 
permeates American thought (229), organicism is 
mystification which fails to mend irreconcilable divisions 
or to ameliorate genuine problems in education.
Paul de Man believes the alienation that the 
nineteenth Romantics experienced is inescapable and that 
any attempt at reconciling subject and object is 
impossible. According to de Man and Geoffrey Hartman, the 
New Critics, who criticized the Romantics for their 
subjectiveness, were equally alienated and equally 
incapable of "escaping this inwardness" (Waters 1).
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If, as de Man has argued, self-consciousness— made possible 
by language— is inescapably accompanied by the reality of 
separation, then our own time, no less than that of the 
nineteenth century, is destined to be inwardly 
contemplative of that separation. De Man believes an 
awareness of this alienation is marked in Romantic texts by 
allegorical difference, not symbolic identification. The 
allegory, de Man says, arises out of a recognition of time 
and mortality, and it "takes place in a subject that has 
sought refuge against the impact of time in a natural world 
to which, in truth, it bears no resemblance" (RT 190).
When educators represent solutions to divisions within 
education with organic metaphors, they are— unlike the 
Romantics— expressing symbolic identification instead of 
allegorical difference. De Man maintains that when the 
Romantics do engage in symbolic identification, they are 
engaged in a "defensive strategy" in their attempt "to 
hide" from their knowledge of an irreparable division 
between nature and self. This symbolic identification is 
not, according to de Man, the main Romantic experience. 
However, when it appears in Romantic texts, it represents 
what he terms "tenacious self-mystification" (RT 191). I 
believe educators engage in the same mystification when 
they wrap their proposed reforms in the plant, the stream, 
the horizon, or in the "black earth of freedom" (Rugg,
Child 314).
The use of organic metaphors to remedy educational 
dualisms is apparent in the Progressive rhetoric of Dewey, 
Rugg, and Pratt; it continues through mid-century in 
Goodman's and Illich's work, and it currently marks 
Willinsky's theories of language arts education. What does 
the organicism acknowledge? Does it recognize the 
inescapable reality of division? De Man suggests that the 
fact that the integration must be accomplished "within the 
medium of language" reflects "that it does not exist in 
actuality" (IS 8). How, then, do educators regard 
language? Because of his importance and because of his 
expansion of his own philosophy of language and meaning, 
John Dewey's symbolic theory of language will, I believe, 
demonstrate a foundation for the use of organic and 
mechanistic metaphors in reform rhetoric.
Dewey's Language: "Bullion in the Vaults"
Emerson's longing for the stability of the natural
object is expressed metaphorically in a May 26, 1837,
journal entry: "As a plant in the earth so I grow in God.
I am only a form of him. He is the soul of me" (62).
However, allegorical difference— which de Man has shown to 
be stronger than symbolic identification in the work of the 
Romantics— takes over in the remainder of the journal 
entry:
Yet why not always so? How came the Individual,
thus armed and impassioned, to parricide thus
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murderously inclined, ever to traverse and kill 
the Divine Life? Ah, wicked Manichee! Into that 
dim problem I cannot enter. A believer in Unity, 
a seer of Unity, I yet behold two.
This particular journal entry demonstrates both 
longing and realization— a wistfulness but a knowing 
better. Emerson's realization arises out of his awareness 
of "the inadequacy of language" (Kronick 24) to reconcile 
subject and object. Metaphoric reconciliation— Emerson's 
becoming a plant in the earth---represents only the longing. 
In Nature Emerson demonstrates this awareness when he says, 
"Words are finite organs of the infinite mind. They cannot 
cover the dimension of what is in truth. They break, chop, 
and impoverish it" (41). The difference between Emerson's 
recognition of the inadequacy of language to heal divisions 
and Dewey's use of metaphor to reconcile them is best 
demonstrated in their attitudes toward language. In Nature 
Emerson speaks of the inability of words to stand for 
things:
The corruption of man is followed by the 
corruption of language. . . . and old words are 
perverted to stand for things which are not; a 
paper currency is employed, when there is no 
bullion in the vaults. In due time the fraud is 
manifest, and words lose all power to stimulate 
the understanding or the affections. . . . (33)
Dewey views language instrumenta1ly: as a tool— "the 
tool of tools" (EN 186). Like Emerson, he employs money as 
a metaphor in attempting to explain the connection between 
signified and signifier, but Dewey believes words are
backed by what Emerson recognizes as missing: "bullion in
the vaults":
Words are spoken of as coins and money. Now 
gold, silver, and instrumentalities of credit are 
first of all, prior to being money, physical 
things with their own immediate and final 
qualities. But as money they are substitutes, 
representations, and surrogates, which embody 
relationships. (EN 173)
Words, then, are substitutions for "physical things with
their own immediate and final qualities"; they "embody
relationships." Dewey thinks of language as an implement
of exhange: money (and, by implication, language)
"facilitates exchange" (EN 173). Like the New Critics,
Dewey looks on language as transparent, as symbolically
connecting word with thing, as leading to communication and
shared meaning:
The meaning of signs moreover always includes 
something common between persons and an object. 
When we attribute meaning to the speaker as his 
intent, we take for granted another person who is 
to share in the execution of the intent. . . . 
Persons and things must alike serve as means in a 
common. shared consequence [my emphasis]. (EN 
185)
Dewey's emphasis on the capacity of language to effect 
shared communication and to culminate in shared meaning is 
yet another example of organicism's metaphysical base— an 
example of Desilet's "hermeneutic communication" (156) and 
of Mailloux's "hermeneutic idealism" (qtd. in Desilet 174). 
Dewey's community of language users and his assumption of 
shared meaning satisfies Desilet's definition of 
hermeneutic communication: ". . . it assumes
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communication, as the sharing of meaning, to be pervasive 
in the use of language”— a choice that "privileges the 
sameness of intersubjectivity in the self/other relation 
. . . [my emphasis]” (153). This emphasis on language as 
shared communication is the same emphasis James Berlin's 
transactional theory of writing supports. Both Berlin and 
Dewey metaphysically privilege the collective in the 
collective/individual hierarchical opposition.
Dewey says ” . . .  every meaning is generic or
universal. It is something common between speaker, hearer
and the thing to which speech refers” (EN 187). Using
Hegel's explanation of the Hie and Nunc in the
Phenomenology. Joseph Kronick addresses the impossibility
of a particular, concrete, ”self-maintaining Now”; for "Now
is always universal and mediated, not immediate”:
The self-maintaining Now exists only in language. 
The Now only maintains itself by the existence of 
its negation; therefore, the Now can never be a 
particular Now, but must be universal, for a 
universal alone is neither this nor that and is 
either this or that. And whenever we say "This," 
it is always the universal "This." (56-57)
Kronick concludes that ". . . we are left with words, which
are universal and never concrete" (57). Dewey's theory of
language, however, focuses on its functional capacities and
on its users' facile substitution and manipulation of
symbols. Thomas Alexander has said that in Dewey's
thinking
[1]anguage is the most efficient and creative of 
the symbol systems invented, for it readily
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passes from one user to another and back. At one 
moment I can be the "I" and at the next moment 
the "you" or the "he," and I have no difficulty 
sorting these out or placing them together. I 
became your "you" and someone's "he." The 
identity here is functional. . . . To be involved 
in communication, then, is for there to be an 
interplay not only between various parties, but 
between the present, past, and the future. (163)
This interplay or negotiation between speakers and writers
and among present, past, and future results in Dewey's idea
of communication, in his belief in a "consensus of action,"
which "brings with it the sense of sharing and merging in a
whole" (EN 184). In Dewey's view, meanings become generic
and common and are readily acknowledged by a community of
users who are thereby unified in a "consensus of action."
Meaning, he says, is not "adventitious and arbitrary." A
word becomes a word "by gaining meaning; and it gains
meaning when it establishes a genuine community of action"
(EN 184-85).
Dewey, however, ignores the inability of language to 
point to a particular "now," and he is forced back on the 
"naive empiricism-idealism" Catherine Belsey has seen in 
the New Critics, who argued that "words stand either for 
things or for experiences, and that these inhere timelessly 
in the phenomenal world or in the continuity of essential 
human nature" (18-19).
Alexander has spoken of Dewey's attempts to use a word 
like "experience" in a new way; he says Dewey "wanted his 
philosophy to transform the culture itself and so he
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attempted to co-opt its language" (xii), but Alexander 
points out how critics were unable to grasp Dewey's new 
meaning. Dewey's difficulty in making a word like 
"experience" signify newly demonstrates the problem that a 
correspondence or transparent theory of language presents, 
for transparency implies a clear and easy transmission— an 
implication that ignores the difficulty of translation and 
the materiality of language.
In a study of Dewey's growth metaphor, Joe Green says 
Dewey "was adamant in the belief that the role of language 
should be the transmission of meaning" (357); Green tells 
of how Dewey wrote Arthur F. Bentley about the "necessity 
of such a definite language symbol-behavior that, if the 
word is used, there will be no doubt as to what it 
designates . . . "  (qtd. in Green 357). His belief in 
"definite language symbo1-behavior" apparently contradicts 
Dewey's own attempt to use a word like "experience" in a 
special way— an attempt that seemingly endorses the idea 
that meaning in language is arbitrary— *a position 
antithetical to the one Dewey customarily advocated. 
Characteristically, Dewey adheres to a symbolic theory of 
language and argues for a connection between signifier and 
signified or between language and nature.
A symbolic theory of language-— such as that held by 
Dewey--undergirds the use by educators of organic 
metaphors, a symbolic theory that is further elucidated
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when he calls a symbol "a direct vehicle, a concrete 
embodiment, a vital incarnation" (EN 82). What follows is 
the history of two metaphors, a characteristic binary 
opposition repeatedly employed by organic educators who 
privilege the natural of their reform over the mechanical 
of the status quo.
Mechanistic Metaphors: Separation and Alienation
The motor, the body, and then the wheel 
Are put on by men who do not feel.
They stand at their jobs from twelve to ten;
They are grimy, oily, mechanical men.
Some turn a screw, some paint it tan,
Each part done by the one same man.
The chain of cars rolls on its way-—
They are cars that are made in half a day.
(qtd. in Pratt 129)
I have quoted part of a poem titled "Machines" written 
by Caroline Pratt's thirteen-year-old group after it had 
visited a Ford assembly plant in the early 1920s. The 
young writers, in attempting to deal with the routine labor 
at the factory, conclude that the mechanical labor has cut 
the men off from meaningful endeavor: "For as they work 
there day after day/ Their minds grow stupid, their brains 
decay./ They are now only grimy mechanical men,/ Yes, just 
grimy, oily, mechanical men" (129). In the children's 
view, the factory work has bound, restrained, and limited 
the minds of the workers: "minds grow stupid" and "brains 
decay." The reaction of these students is harmonious with 
that of Pratt and other Progressives who look on restraint
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of the individual mind as arising from mechanical division. 
And what better symbol of division in the early years of 
the century than Ford-— the company which wrought the 
assembly line?
In reform literature mechanistic metaphors are even 
more prevalent than organic metaphors. Suggestive of 
division and alienation, the mechanistic metaphor is 
perhaps employed most repetitively in the 1960s. The 
earlier Progressive writers illustrate their sense of 
separation and alienation again and again with figures of 
machines, factories, construction, and confinement. Though 
attached to various problems of school setting, curriculum, 
teacher, and student, the mechanistic metaphor signifies 
boundaries, limits, restraints. When used (as it often is) 
in tandem with the organic metaphor, the freedom denied by 
mechanism is realized in organic growing, blossoming, 
flowing.
I have studied the figurative language of three 
reformers— John Dewey (Schools of To-Morrow. 1915),2 
Caroline Pratt (I Learn from Children. 1948), and Harold 
Rugg (The Child-Centered School. 1928). I chose these 
specific works because they deal with the establishing of 
Progressive schools, they reflect early dreams and goals, 
and they represent the strong years of the movement 
(Pratt's book, though published in 1948, retraces a career 
which began in 1914). In these three Progressive texts,
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the machine generally represents impersonality, 
standardization, and deadening routine. In Schools of To- 
Morrow . Dewey complains of the "school machinery" and its 
methodical, mechanical pace: It "works on at the same
rate, regardless of any individual pupil or study," 
resulting in the student's conclusion that "his own efforts 
are not important" (190). Dewey later laments the division 
of the curriculum from actual social life and surmises that 
workers unschooled in the social and physical facts behind 
the machines with which they work will become victims of 
the machines, will become, in Dewey's words, "blind cogs 
and pinions" (246).
Like Dewey, Rugg also complains of the school 
machinery. He believes theater has been excluded from the 
traditional curriculum because teachers had resented its 
interruption of the "smooth running machine of school 
classes" (267); the old education, Rugg argues, was life- 
denying, "crushing out life it purported to nourish," while 
"originality, initiative, individuality" are being "fed 
into revolving rollers, to be flattened into conformity, 
standardized" (293). In Rugg's assessment, the teacher too 
has become machine-like; the "mechanic-teacher" has become 
the product of a system "she helps to perpetuate." She is 
"a blind, helpless cog in the great machine of enforced 
mass education" (323). Rugg's mechanic-teacher has 
memorized her subject matter, has marked her books, has
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"her eye on the answer," but she is divorced from "growth 
. . . and the psychology of mental and emotional life"
(322). He argues that progressive education offers freedom 
to the teacher as well as to the student: the "artisan-
teacher" will be encouraged to be original and 
individualistic— to be a "guide," not a "taskmaster" or "a 
kind of section boss for the huge railroading system known 
as school" (322) .
The attitude of Pratt's thirteen-year-old students 
toward the "grimy, oily, mechanical men" mirrors the 
aversion of their teacher. Looking back on her own 
childhood, Pratt contrasts that world— "a wide wonderful 
place"— with the confinement of the lives of her students, 
whose world has become "a narrow cell, walled about with 
mysteries of complex machinery" (xv). As Dewey and Rugg 
had complained of the lack of freedom in the old 
curriculum, Pratt says the old curriculum has resulted in 
students' lack of interest, curiosity, initiative, and 
imagination, making it appear that the students had been 
"turned out by a factory" (5).
Akin to the machine and factory metaphors is the pump 
metaphor used by both Dewey and Rugg to describe the 
teacher-student relationship. In Dewey's mind the 
reservoir and pump represent the traditional idea of 
teacher as a reservoir of information with the student as a 
pump to suction out and passively receive the information.
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He calls for a curriculum to abolish this mechanical 
relationship (87). Rugg suggests the teacher become 
something more than a "force pump" (229).
Indicative of restraint in Progressive rhetoric are
metaphors of confinement: cells, prison, walls, yokes,
lids, shells. Dewey pictures the traditional school that
fetters students:
Instead of providing this chance for growth and 
discovery, the ordinary school impresses the 
little one into a narrow area, into a melancholy 
silence, into a forced attitude of mind and body, 
till his curiosity is dulled into surprise at the 
strange things happening to him. Very soon his 
body is tired of his task and he begins to find 
ways of evading his teacher, to look about him 
for an escape from his little prison. (20)
In Rugg’s work, students of traditional education are 
said to be "pigeonholed" in "long rows of desks, filed in 
stereotyped classrooms as alike as the cabinets in which 
the methodical principals preserve their records" (2), or 
they suffer from a day "pigeonholed" into "strict timed 
segments” (73) . He makes a plea for the "lid" to be taken 
off students so that they might build up attitudes of self- 
expression (180); this he later repeats when he asks that 
the lid be taken off to let the child reveal his "genuine 
self" (235). In speaking of the confinement of students in 
traditional schools, he charges that the "rigid desks, 
desks in rows” were there "to prison youth while education 
laid its heavy yoke upon them” (302-03).
63
Pratt too employs confinement metaphors. The child's 
world has become a cell (xv). The curriculum of the old 
formal schools was "fixed, immovable" (137); her 
experimental school, however, frees both student and 
teacher from this "straitjacket" curriculum, allowing for 
the "group's interest, the events that were the talk of the 
dinner table at night or the headlines of the morning 
paper" to guide the curriculum (139). Looking on the 
traditional school as a "curious confinement" for children, 
Pratt wonders why friendliness in the classroom has been 
considered "a disturbance" (166).
Moreover, the three Progressive reformers condemn
those who confine and bind. Dewey calls the traditional
teacher a "cicerone and dictator" instead of a "watcher and
helper." And Rugg speaks of "the old regime" (125), the
college and administrative "rulers" of the schools, the
"reign" of college entrance requirements, the "regime" of
"education-as-discipline" (245), and the "autocratic
teacher" (267). Pratt's advocacy of educational liberty is
opposed to a teacher behaving "like a classroom Hitler":
If we were preparing our children to live under 
an autocratic regime I could understand the need 
for iron discipline. . . . But we are preparing 
our children to be responsible citizens in a 
democracy. . . . Why then the screwed-down 
benches, the interdiction on speech, the marching 
through the halls in silent single file, the 
injunction on the teacher to behave like a 
classroom Hitler? (167)
Though Lawrence Cremin speaks of the death of 
Progressivism in 1955 (vii), the 1960s deschooling movement 
picked up on and intensified the mechanistic metaphors the 
Progressives had used.3 There is, however, an alteration. 
Among educational intellectuals like Paul Goodman, the 
metaphor is no longer based on a grimy assembly-line 
worker. For thinkers like Goodman and Ivan Illich, minds 
can grow stupid and brains decay as easily from the 
impersonality and routine of the Ford board room as from 
its assembly line. Both Goodman and Illich record the 
mechanization that results from the mating of education and 
business. As a remedy for the resulting division, Goodman 
recommends that young people secure their best education by 
quitting college (48) or by not going to classes at all 
(138); Illich promotes "deschooling."
Both Goodman, whose The Community of Scholars (1962) 
focuses on postsecondary education, and Illich, whose 
Deschoolinq Society (1970) gave a name to a movement that 
proposed the elimination of education as it was known at 
the time, identify fragmentation with metaphors that 
duplicate Progressive images of machines and confinement. 
Each wants to remove boundaries, limits, restraints; to do 
so, they propose radical changes in American education.
The refrain appearing in each writer's work is that of 
standardization and impersonality as represented by the
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"educational machine" (Illich 48). Goodman says the
university is
really a machine for its own sake [which] run[s ] 
and produce[s] brand goods for selling and 
buying. . . . More revolutionary products like 
free spirit, individual identity, vocation, 
community. . . are, rather, disapproved. But 
frictionless and rapid running is esteemed; and 
by clever co-ordination of the moving parts, and 
lots of money as lubrication, it can be 
maximized. (63)
The problem, Goodman maintains, is the business machine
that runs American colleges; this machine isolates and
alienates what should be a "community of scholars," related
one to the other, to knowledge, and to life. Instead, the
business mentality of the administration looks on school
"as a teaching machine to train the young by predigested
programs in order to get pre-ordained marketable skills"
(8). According to Goodman, the community of scholars has
been replaced by a community of administrators (74). He
thinks colleges are run like banks and have become
"factory-like"; they "do not encourage communities and
differentiation" but "behave like department stores opening
new departments and sometimes branches, and increasing
efficiency by standardizing the merchandise and the sales
force" (76). The style of the administration "is
impersonal, like any machine" (80). And walls, he
concludes, separate the university from the rest of society
(5). In Goodman's view, the administrative machine is
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incapable of reuniting teachers, students, studies in a 
community of scholars.
Illich sees a similar educational machine. And like
Goodman, Illich looks back to incidental learning of
medieval villages (33) ; but modern education, he laments,
is a business:
School sells curriculum— -a bundle of goods made 
according to the same process and having the same 
structure as other merchandise. Curriculum 
production for most schools begins with allegedly 
scientific research, on whose basis educational 
engineers predict future demand and tools for the 
assembly line, within the limits set by budgets 
and taboos. The distributor-teacher delivers the 
finished product to the consumer-pupil. . . .
(59)
Illich and Goodman find the mechanization of administration 
bringing about a concomitant mechanization of teacher, 
curriculum, and student; repeatedly the two mourn the loss 
of spontaneity: Illich draws consumption as preventing us
from being "spontaneous, independent" or "related to each 
other" (76). Spontaneity and relation— qualities which are 
not reflected in the machine— -are characteristics 
organicists frequently value.4
The machine image is the overarching metaphor in 
Illich's book, and the self-sealing casket is his ultimate 
machine:
Our society resembles the ultimate machine which 
I once saw in a New York toy shop. It was a 
metal casket which, when you touched a switch, 
snapped open to reveal a mechanical hand.
Chromed fingers reached out for the lid, pulled 
it down, and locked it from the inside. It was a 
box; you expected to be able to take something
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out of it; yet all it contained was a mechanism
for closing the cover. (151)
The 1960s reform rhetoric of Goodman and Illich underscores 
the lack of connection and the absence of community in 
American education. The two reformers anticipate being 
able to find a meaningful whole; instead, Illich's 
"ultimate machine" reveals only "a mechanism for closing 
the cover. "5
John Willinsky, who says the "seeds" of his New 
Literacy were planted during the 1960s reawakening of 
progressive education, subscribes to the process theory of 
writing. Willinsky, as well as others, gives Gordon Rohman 
and Albert Wlecke,6 two Michigan State University 
researchers, credit for initiating pre-writing in process 
writing pedagogy. Rohman and Wlecke's work, like that of 
Willinsky, endorses expressionistic writing— an approach 
with goals opposed to those of objective or product- 
oriented current-traditional schools of composition. As 
had Goodman and Illich, Rohman and Wlecke use metaphors of 
the machine to describe division in the composing process. 
With their emphasis on the writing process as discovery, 
they find objective rhetoric's concern with "methods, 
tradition, conditioning, grammar, and the like" to fall 
short of a "fresh perspective"; indeed, they believe 
objective approaches have a kind of machine deadliness 
about them: " . . .  such approaches can be positively
harmful by reducing writing and writers to 'things' on
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machine analogies" (23) . Rohman and Wlecke believe that 
though they live in an "age dominated by machine 
analogies," the writing process should be "more like a 
growing process than a mechanical one" (20).
Their research, actually a government-sponsored 1964
study, was conducted at Michigan State University with both
experimental and traditional classes of students. A
colleague who aided in the evaluation of the two groups'
work found the essays of the traditional classes to be
marked "with the dead level tone of the hum of an assembly
line, for there is no personality involved in them." A
machine, he determines, could turn out work with such
"robot-like results," the machine metaphor indicating the
impersonality resulting from a division of thought from
process. The consequences are once again a kind of death
like that of rusted car-bodies in a junk yard 
waiting to be further corrupted by rust as they
wait to be smashed into squares of mere iron to
be lifted by a mechanical magnet into a truck to 
be carried to a smelter to be made into reclaimed
iron to be made into objects on an assembly line.
(140)
Willinsky says that those who work from an "organic 
conception of the mind" are reluctant "to conceive of the 
mind as a machine, or of language and learning as 
mechanical processes" ("Seldom" 268-69). In fact,
Willinsky credits the Romantics with supplying him with the 
two metaphors of the New Literacy: the machine and the
garden ("Seldom" 271). Believing authoritarian educators
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and too great an emphasis on the book to have detrimental 
effects on literacy, Willinsky cautions against 
transforming the child "from a flower to an engine, all for 
want of the accidental and spontaneous" ("Seldom" 276).
Two other process theorists whom Willinsky cites and 
whom he calls "Neo-Romantics" ("Seldom" 277) are C. H. 
Knoblauch and Lil Brannon. Berlin believes Knoblauch and 
Brannon more expressionistic than the epistemic label they 
claim (RR 185); however, as with other process theorists, 
they disdain the dividing of composing into parts. While 
the early work of Rohman and Wlecke defined a pre-writing 
step, Knoblauch and Brannon are firmly opposed to steps or 
parts divisions: "The parts of an automobile engine
precede the engine viewed as a whole; but the parts of a
plant, stem, leaves, roots do not precede the plant as a
whole" (84-85).
Berlin finds an early ancestor of process theory in 
the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century work of Fred 
Newton Scott, whose organic and epistemic theories of 
composition Berlin himself endorses. He draws a distinct 
line between Scott's organic metaphor-driven theory and the
machine metaphors he uses to characterize objective
rhetoric. The objective rhetoric that Scott opposes 
sanctions, in Berlin's words, a "mechanistic view of the 
mind as container or muscle" (WI 79-80); the essential 
difference between process and objective (current-
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traditional) rhetorics can be gauged, according to Berlin, 
by the metaphors that ground each theory: current-
traditional composition "is governed by the image of the 
machine"; the metaphor guiding Scott's early epistemic 
theory is that of the plant, the essay being "regarded not 
as a dead form, to be analyzed into its component parts, 
but as a living product of an active, creative mind" (WI 
83-84).
Organic Metaphors: "A Fine Flowering"
A discontinuity between language and nature 
prevents the reader from ever making contact with 
nature. To experience nature, we must interpret 
it, which means we must violate it by inscribing 
man and nature in the text of culture. The 
search for nature leads into the pit of metaphor. 
(Kronick 24)
The use of the organic metaphor follows the Romantics' 
voice of symbolic union and longing, a voice de Man 
believes uncharacteristic of the principal Romantic 
experience. Revisionist scholarship has shown the 
Romantics' own realization that identification with nature 
emanates from human consciousness and the Romantic 
recognition that any such coupling is accomplished through 
the imposition of the writer's will, not through an 
identification of some sort of inherent natural unity.
The organic metaphor, like the mechanistic metaphor, 
is, then, an identity established through language. The 
two metaphors are another form of the binary opposition
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represented by the terms "nature" and "culture." Sharon 
Crowley has seen this sort of hierarchical opposition as 
indicative of the metaphysics of presence. Other binaries 
that Crowley names include mind/body, presence/absence, 
theory/practice, reality/appearance, content/form, literal/ 
figurative, and so on (12); these, she says, result in our 
privileging one term in the pair (such as the first term in 
the pairs just identified) over the other "as a way of 
acknowledging, and yet denying, the movement of 
differance."7 Crowley thinks these binaries have long 
marked American education (for example, the separation of 
thought or content from language or form) (12).
Metaphysical thought in education, then, favors nature over 
culture when privileging the plant over the machine.
J. Hillis Miller has examined pedagogical metaphors in 
George Eliot's Mill on the Floss. He explains how Eliot 
offers one educational metaphor after another: the
students's mind as ”a field to be plowed and harrowed by 
grammar and geometry; teaching as 'instilling' information; 
mind as an intellectual stomach; mind as a blank sheet of 
paper; mind as a mirror” (45-46). The problem, Miller 
posits, is that "each metaphorically based theory. . . has 
its own built-in fallacious bias and leads to its own 
special form of catastrophe in the classroom" (48). Just 
as a mind is not a field or a blank sheet or a stomach, a 
student is neither machine nor plant.
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Nonetheless, three Progressive educators— Dewey, Rugg, 
and Pratt-— all identify their reforms with nature: Dewey
speaks of students continuing the curiosity of their pre­
school years by "following the path of natural growth 
(Schools 21); Rugg says creativity should slowly "blossom" 
(Child 253); and Pratt speaks of students who throw out 
"roots" (130) and who "wither" (82) if required to learn 
subjects in bits and pieces. But students and curriculum 
are not plants; what Miller refers to as a "fallacious 
bias" exists in these organic metaphors that attempt to 
identify with nature what educators consider positive.
"An image of this type," says de Man, "is indeed the
simplest and most fundamental we can conceive of, the
metaphorical expression most apt to gain our immediate
acquiescence" (IS 7). Why do we want students to follow
the path of "natural growth," and why do we ask for
creativity to "blossom" in the classroom? De Man says we
are nostalgic for the origin of the natural object— the
flowers which the Progressive educators employ as growing,
sending out roots, and blossoming— the natural object which
seems "to have no beginning and no end" (IS 4). But a
human being, unlike plants, does lead a temporal existence
with knowledge of his or her mortality. De Man explains:
The obviously desirable sensory aspects of the 
flower express the ambivalent aspiration toward a 
forgotten presence that gave rise to the image, 
for it is in experiencing the material presence
of the particular flower that the desire arises
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to be reborn in the manner of the natural 
creation. (IS 6)
In the three periods of American education I surveyed 
— Progressive, mid-century, and late-century reform 
movements— organic metaphors with their "obviously 
desirable sensory aspects" and their metaphysical base mark 
the discourse. "Growth" is the organic metaphor identified 
with Dewey and Progressive reform, but its use is so 
pervasive that I have omitted any detailed consideration of 
it from my study. Green's analysis of the metaphor as used 
by Dewey in The School and Society, graphs three different 
uses of the growth metaphor; however, he concludes that 
Dewey generally binds growth to his concept of democracy 
(361) .
Generally, Caroline Pratt does not use "growth" in 
defining students' emotional, social, or cognitive 
processes; instead, she uses "living" metaphors and a few 
horticultural tropes. She calls on "growth" metaphors in 
references to her school and teachers: she says her school
will "grow" (40) and speaks of it as "a living, growing 
organism" (64); at the close of the book, she envisions the 
school from the vantage of her old age, but in 1948 the 
school, in Pratt's mind, is still a "living organism, with 
a vitality of its own, putting forth new growth" (181).
With her growth metaphor, Pratt bestows continuity, or as 
de Man has pointed out, bestows being "reborn in the manner
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of the natural creation" on her experimental project: it
will not die; it will continue.
In writing of the teachers needed for her new school, 
Pratt demands freedom for her teachers, saying that she 
wants them to "grow" (64). Here, again, is a metaphor 
appropriating the freedom of a natural object.8 The 
Progressives associate their reform with the freedom of 
plants— a freedom which they believe divided, machine-like 
human beings, curricula, and pedagogy do not possess.
Pratt has failed to consider what Peggy Rosenthal has seen 
as the "deterministic implications" of organic metaphors, 
for a plant is essentially programmed for growth: "it
simply follows" what are "its inherent laws of 
development." Rosenthal continues, "The organic metaphor 
is thus a poor choice. . . when we want to assert human 
freedom . . ." (79); yet the organic metaphors of Pratt and 
other organicist educators suggest the plant as a model of 
freedom from restraints, rules, limits, routine, and 
division.
Pratt uses other metaphors related to the growth 
metaphor: figures of "living" and horticulture. Offering 
continuity similar to that bestowed in her image of the 
school as a growing, living organism is Pratt's dictum that 
education is not an end in itself but something to be 
"continued"; education, she says, is a "living thing" (14). 
Students comprising her six-year-old group are not products
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to be written about in school records but a "living group" 
(65). "Like healthy plants," Pratt writes, "children 
absorbed in jobs, throw roots out in every direction from 
the jobs to draw in ever more educational nourishment"
(130). When Pratt's seven-year-old pupils are exposed to a 
traditionalist, one who divides reading and writing from 
the children's other activities, their lives "withered"
(82). Like Emerson's rose, which lives above time and is 
thus connected to God, the Sevens enjoy what Pratt wishes 
us to see as full organic connection: absorbed in work,
"roots" thrown out, "nourishment" drawn in. But when they 
are asked to learn in parts— in bits and pieces— subjects 
that have been divided into rigid time slots rather than 
integrated into their work, the children are deprived of 
their sustenance. With subjects set apart discretely, they 
lose their organic wholeness, and the children wither. 
Advocating self-expression, Rugg explains that students 
become more confident when teachers themselves model self- 
expressive behavior. Then, he says, students' creativity 
slowly "blossomfs]" into "a fine flowering" that can exist 
only in "an air of freedom" (Child 253). Rugg's organic 
metaphor thus asks us to link the plant's freedom with 
freedom from restraint in the traditional classroom.
Both Rugg and Pratt use the horizon in metaphors that 
treat the curriculum of the new education: the Progressive
idea of initiating the child in the near (the child's own
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neighborhood, the city, and the region) before ushering in 
things distant. Pratt explains that she sees the child in 
relation to "his own horizons59 and sees "how the circle of 
his interest widens outward, like the circles made by a 
stone thrown into a pond" (8). Similarly, Rugg uses the 
horizon to advance the idea of studying things close first; 
for, he writes, the work of later years will "expand the 
horizon" to the world at large (93).
The organic metaphors of the Progressives moved into 
the 1960s, accompanied by the mechanistic metaphors the 
Progressives were so fond of; however, both Goodman's and 
Illich's prose has fewer organic than mechanistic 
metaphors. Their organic metaphors, however, undergird 
their reform proposals. Goodman’s "community of scholars" 
is based on organic relations and connections. He 
envisions not walls between the school and society but a 
two-way transaction of students "enlivened" by society and 
society revitalized by the young leaving the university.
He speaks of the social purposes of such a community of 
scholars : " . . .  with such purposes, society has its
growth as organically part of itself, like the cambrium of 
a tree" (52).
Illich's central metaphor is an organic one: what he
proposes instead of schools is "learning webs." He tells 
why he chose "web" instead of "network." "Network," he 
believes, designates "the channels reserved to material
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selected by others for indoctrination, instruction, and 
enterta inment" (109-10), and though he wishes to avoid the 
connotation of “entrapment89 associated with "web," he 
prefers the organic metaphor to the cultural one.
Willinsky's embracing of organic metaphors is 
enthusiastic; he believes the mechanistic alternative leads 
to positivism— -that is, to what he believes will "measure 
and control"— and he says this alternative "may convince 
many teachers of the urgency and rightness of the organic 
metaphor" (NL 192). Willinksy has set up the binary 
opposition of organic/mechanical so that one term— the 
organic— is privileged over the other; the opposition he 
draws allows no movement of differance and results in what 
Derrida calls the metaphysics of presence.
Saying that he does not wish to "forsake" his
Romantic models, Willinsky draws a parallel between a
student striving for self-expression and an onion:
the writer now faces becoming an onion, as self- 
exploratory writing is a peeling back of the 
layers revealing only other, inner leaves, one 
after the other, no truer or more certain than 
those on the surface, but more translucent, 
slippery. . . . (23)
And Willinsky does not limit his organic metaphors to his
writing theories; he also uses them in exploring his use of
reader-response interpretation: "Learning to read is
finding a meaningfulness in print that is rooted in
studentsf experience and grows through students' experience
in texts that are ends in themselves. . . " (68).
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His interpretation of the Romantics as organicists is
a misreading which I believe to be grounded in the
traditional way they were interpreted; in fact, both he and
Rohman and Wlecke use M. H. Abrams to supplement their own
interpretations of the Romantics. Willinsky credits Abrams
with describing the Romantic endorsement of organicism and
their antipathy to mechanism:
If the mechanical view looks to the domain of the 
well-tuned machine or flow-chart for its model of 
thought, the organic theory turns to the garden, 
to fields of living, growing things, in which the 
self-evolved interdependence of parts is the 
secret of life, as Abrams has described it [my 
emphasis]. (NL 190)
Rohman and Wlecke's expressionism is anchored in both 
Abrams's traditional reading of the Romantics and the 
organicism of the New Criticism. They believe their 
prewriting activities will empower students "to search for 
a 'seed-idea' out of which an organically coherent essay 
might 'grow'" (41). The origin of their organic metaphor 
is the philosophy of Romanticism, its best expression they 
believe to be articulated in M. H. Abrams's The Mirror and 
the Lamp (11).
Rohman and Wlecke's work is a veritable hothouse of 
the organic: meditation in prewriting will, they argue,
result in something like "creation itself"-— there will be 
"growth through moments along a line until a 'flowering' of 
concept or idea" occurs (31); analogical thinking in 
prewriting will result in what they hope will be a
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"germinatting] discovery" (38) ; and they caution that the 
essay "is not to be seen in external fashion" but should be 
regarded by the students as "a developing plant, growing 
from within themselves" (57).
Their Michigan colleagues are told to evaluate the
essays by closely observing the idea of "form"; that is,
they ask their colleagues to be true to New Critical dicta:
By 'form' we mean something better described in 
organic metaphors s a sense of the "growth" of a 
"seed idea" or single theme, "exfoliation" of an 
argument or proof, "fruition" in the totality of 
the essay. The whole seems a "growing" whole, 
not necessarily a static or finished whole. The 
parts serve the whole as an arm the body, the 
leaf the plant. (131)
Process theorists Knoblauch and Brannon enlist the
same plant metaphors when they explain the impossibility of
teaching writing:
the ability to use language can— and does— grow, 
but it is not consciously learned; it can be 
nurtured but it isn't taught. One enables a
plant to grow by watering its soil, not by paying
elaborate attention to each of its leaves (87).
When educators cast their reform in the bipolar 
structure of machine and plant, they privilege the natural 
(the leafy plant, the flowing stream, the blooming flower) 
over the mechanism (the assembly line, the rusty 
automobile, the self-sealing casket). It becomes, in fact, 
an easy choice: life over death. And though de Man has
shown that natural images are the "simplest and most 
fundamental" and are "most apt to gain our immediate 
acquiescence," educators who represent their reform as a
reflection of the natural image are not deriving that 
organic unity from nature but from the very thing that 
separates humankind from nature: consciousness and
language.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. Peggy Rosenthal says that wholism and relation have 
always seemed preferable to parts and division: "it's one
of the ideas that seem inherently good. And Western 
thought has always, or at least since Plato made the One 
the highest good, perceived the whole as especially 
meaningful and reached for it as the object of knowledge" 
(p. 189, Words & Their Values: Some Leading Words and
Where They Lead Us).
2. Evelyn Dewey is listed as a co-author; however, I will 
in future references refer to Dewey as sole author. It 
appears that his daughter fulfilled a research role and 
that Dewey wrote the text. I do not wish to slight the 
contribution of Evelyn Dewey; her research role appears to 
reflect the subordinate status to which women were 
historically assigned, an issue which is not related to my 
study. After initially recognizing both father and 
daughter as co-authors of Schools of To-Morrow. Lawrence 
Cremin— in his influential study of American progressivism, 
The Transformation of the School: Proqressivism in 
American Education: 1876-1957— refers to Dewey as sole 
author.
3. Peter Schrag's 1967 Saturday Review essay, "Education's 
Romantic Critics," addresses the linkage between Goodman, 
Friedenberg, Holt, and Henry and John Dewey. Schrag views 
alienation as a central concern and the machine as a 
metaphor of that alienation.
4. See Peter Thorslev's analysis of spontaneity as a 
characterisitic of organicism (chp. 4 of Romantic 
Contraries: Freedom and Destiny).
5. Rena Foy's 1962 study is another reflection of mid­
century education's concern with the individual losing 
identity and becoming "no more than a cog, 
indistinguishable from other cogs, in a machine composed 
not of metal parts but of linked and intermeshed human 
beings"; she warns of the dangers of the division of labor 
and machine technology to education (p. 358, "The 
Philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Its Educational 
Implications").
6. Berlin goes further. He believes Rohman and Wlecke 
established the language of process writing.
7. Kronick explains "differance" as a Derridean neologism 
indicating "that the process of signification presupposes 
that the sign represents the absent thing for which it 
stands. . . the sign differs from the thing and defers or
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postpones the moment we can come into contact with the 
thing itself." The thing itself "is never present to 
itself (which would require that it be free from language); 
it is always related to something other than itself and is 
constituted by its relation to this other" (p. 57, American 
Poetics of History: From Emerson to the Moderns).
8. Freedom from authority is the general interpretation 
Max Black has given the growth metaphor. See Scheffler's 
The Language of Education, p. 49.
CHAPTER 4 
THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION
Educators who use as metaphors for their reform 
growing plants, blooming flowers, and flowing streams while 
representing traditional education with rusting automobiles 
and mind-decaying assembly-line work figuratively allude to 
educational life and death. Perhaps their symbolic 
identification of the plant with life and the machine with 
death derives from Coleridge. In 1815 Coleridge wrote 
Wordsworth about how Cartesian philosophy had substituted a 
machine for a world created by divine fiat: "a lifeless
Machine whirled about by the dust of its own Grinding. .
. . " He proposed to Wordsworth "the substitution of life 
and intelligence . . . for the philosophy of mechanism, 
which, in everything that is most worthy of the human 
intellect, strikes Death. . . [original emphasis]" (qtd. in 
Abrams 169-70). But if in the nineteenth century the 
machine represented division and death to Coleridge, the 
machine became in its twentieth-century manifestations even 
more representative— at least in educational discourse— of 
all that was deadening. And if educators like Dewey, Rugg, 
Pratt, Illich, and Willinsky were prone to symbolic 
identification of their reforms with nature, they were also 
susceptible to casting their theorizing about thinking,
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especially creative thinking, in organic frames. Often, as 
with Dewey's aesthetics and the foundational theories of 
compositionists, an acceptance of a symbolic theory of 
language is accompanied by a Coleridgean concept of 
imagination.
In fact, rhetorician Ann Berthoff argues that 
Coleridge's concepts of the symbol and the imagination are 
identical:
In one pole of Coleridge's theory of the active 
mind is Imagination, at the other we find Symbol: 
neither is conceivable without the other. The 
reason for speaking in terms of polarity and 
polar oppositions is provided by the Coleridgean 
doctrine that oppositions are expressions of one 
and the same force. (58)
She believes, with Coleridge, that "the Imagination creates
in symbols the reality we know.” This view of the creative
imagination is central to an educational organicism that
gives to the imagination the task of reconciling divisions
and polarities, "forming and transforming" them.
Organicist educators believe that language "provides the
means by which the mind can act according to its nature";
this is what Coleridge means, says Berthoff, when he
repeatedly says that knowledge comes from within (58).
The reconciling of opposites accomplished through the 
imagination and symbolic language is a fundamental 
organicist concept. This is how Berlin characterizes both 
his own philosophy and Emerson's: reality is the
concurrence of subject and object with "language as the
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agent of mediation” (WI 57). This is Dewey's idea that 
human beings are connected to nature through the 
imagination— an organ of nature (CF 53)— and symbol— a 
"direct vehicle," a "concrete embodiment,” a "vital 
incarnation" (EN 82). And this is what Willinsky means 
when he speaks of process writing as a "clear instance" of 
what students' writing can accomplish when guided by the 
concept of Coleridge's "blending, fusing" imagination 
("Seldom" 274). These organic views are not consonant with 
Emerson's conviction that language is incapable of 
representing reality. They do not reflect the divisions 
the Romantics acknowledge, nor do they reflect the Romantic 
imagination. What these organicist notions do indicate is 
de Man's pointed observation that organic reconciliation is 
always accomplished through language, a condition which 
reveals that the reconciliation does not in actuality take 
place (IS 8).
When organicists examine a creative act, they rely on 
natural images to explain how an essay, a poem, or 
creative idea "grows." They speak of natural growth, 
inner processes, organically developing form, spontaneity, 
natural rhythm, the lack of conscious will, and the 
resulting organic totality or unity of the creative 
product. Seldom do they speak of creating an essay or a 
poem as an act of conscious deliberation, and to speak of 
creating in steps or stages is, by its mechanical nature,
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anathema to them. In "The Philosophy of Composition," Poe
narrates the anything-but-organic process by which he
constructed "The Raven." Composition is, Poe argues, not
an act of "fine frenzy" or "ecstatic intuition" but one of
"painful erasures and interpolations" (364). According to
Poe, conscious will dictated every step of the process:
. . . no one point in its composition is 
referable either to accident or intuition . . . 
the work proceeded step by step, to its 
completion with the precision and rigid 
consequence of a mathematical problem. (365)
Wimsatt also believes the poem is a "contrived moment":
This is so even on the supposition that the 
author achieves his sonnet in one perfect first 
draft. For he reviews it and accepts it and puts 
it out as a poem. No matter how spontaneous and 
lucky in one sense, in another sense it is also 
artificial. (69)
When organicists fail to consider the painful-erasures-kind
of thinking and speak of the student as an onion or the
essay as a germinating seed, they provide not fusion but an
organic metaphor that fails to acknowledge the complexities
of cognition. By smoothing over differences with
suggestions of organic unity and by looking at creativity
as something already there which requires only an
opportunity for unfolding, they avoid the problem of
reflection.
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Growth Like Roses and Lilies
Coleridge's theory of the imagination is structured 
according to the plant-machine antithesis: the
"mechanical” memory and "passive" fancy as opposed to the 
vital imagination that "assimilates," "blends," "fuses," 
and "recreates" (qtd. in Abrams 168-69). In following 
Coleridge's theory of the organic imagination, educators 
like Dewey and Rugg and compositionists like Rohman,
Wlecke, Willinsky, and Knoblauch and Brannon employ the 
same bipolar metaphors: the creative imagination
represented by the vital growth processes of nature and 
objective theories of creativity aligned with mechanism, 
rigidity, and deadly formalism.
For example, Dewey terms an act of expression 
"mechanical" when it originates solely out of "direct 
effort of 'wit and will'" (AE 73); using Keats, he argues 
that "reasonings" originate "like that of the movements of 
a wild creature toward its goal" and that "they become 
spontaneous, 'instinctive,' . . . sensuous and immediate, 
poetic" (AE 33). To Dewey, Poe's explanation of his 
mechanistic construction of "The Raven" indicates only that 
the creative acts of some people require greater degrees of 
"participation of wit and will" than those of others (AE 
74). In the work of another Progressive, Harold Rugg, an 
imaginative act again is represented as a natural 
expression of an internally generated impulse. Rugg
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describes a person involved in an expressive act as an 
"active and self-directed11 organism, not a reactive 
automaton controlled bv stimuli from the outside [original 
emphasis]98 (Imagination 292).
In the 1960s Rohman and Wlecke, early process 
expressionists, told their students to think of the essay 
as a "developing plant, growing from within themselves" 
from what they called a "seed-idea," one with "sufficient 
potency to beget other ideas . . . some of which may have 
the power, like a plant," of assimilating different 
elements to the "total organism of the essay" (57-58). 
Rohman and Wlecke abjure regulating creative process by 
mechanism: " . . .  writing is more like a growing process
than a mechanical one" (20).
Current theorists like Willinsky and Knoblauch and 
Brannon continue this dialectical pattern. Maintaining 
that the "seeds of the New Literacy were planted during the 
1960s reawakening of progressive education" (19), Willinsky 
holds that his organic theories venerate process, "a 
reverence which is not driven like the Enlightenment by a 
need to uncover the gearing of its mechanism and the logic 
of its engineering" but by Coleridge's conception of the 
imagination as "a living faculty" (190). Advocates of 
students' using language "unself-consciously" (87), process 
theorists Knoblauch and Brannon stress that language use is 
not learned. "The ability to use language," they argue,
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"can— and does— grow, but it is not consciously learned"
(88). They refuse to think of the composing act in steps,
stages, and parts:
When discourse is conceived in mechanistic terms, the 
parts are primary and the focus is on the ways in 
which the parts work together. . . . When discourse is 
conceived in organic terms, its plasticity or 
continuity is emphasized. (85)
Dewey's aesthetic beliefs are closely aligned with 
both expressionist and transactional rhetorics. And though 
transactionalists like Berlin, Raschke, and Berthoff 
believe reality is derived from the interaction of subject, 
object, and language— that is, that meaning is derived only 
through social and communal efforts— and expressionists 
like Rohman and Wlecke and Willinsky rely on a subjective 
search for meaning, both streams of process are, in their 
organic emphases, metaphysica1ly argued.
The idea of linking a student's creativity with the 
growth processes of a plant was in the Progressive era, in 
the 1960s, and is, in today's process theories, an attempt 
to deliver composition from the clutch of an objective or 
skills orientation. This attempt at establishing a more 
"natural" relationship between the student and the act of 
composing is frequently cast in metaphors that are 
illogical and deterministic. What is disturbing to 
Berthoff and other transactionalists, however, is the 
solipsism they fear expressionist subjectivism produces. 
Ross Winterowd, another transactionalist, believes "growth
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models" render images of a "student communing with himself 
or herself" (xii) . l Winterowd's argument with author- 
centered, expressionistic models of composition— such as 
those of Rugg, Rohman and Wlecke, and Willinsky-— is that 
they generate solipsism because meaning is brought about 
through isolated self-engagement. Berthoff— like Berlin, 
Raschke, and Winterowd— also fears "creative/expressive/ 
private use of language" (67). Transactionalists are eager 
to separate their own process emphasis on the communal 
aspects of writing from the individualist emphasis of the 
expressionists. Both expressionists and transactionalists, 
however, are prone to link process with natural growth, 
especially when they, in a common voice, confront the 
"machine" of current-traditiona1ism.2
What seems at least equally as significant as 
transactionalist fears of expressionist solipsism, however, 
is the determinism and faulty logic of the metaphors that 
both groups employ. To both, writing is seen as an 
unfolding of something already there, a genetic gift— a 
seed planted, needing only the nurturing "facilitating" of 
a sympathetic gardener-teacher for growth and blossoming to 
occur. Berthoff says this geneticism is an essential and 
necessary characteristic of "natural process, namely, that 
what develops is in a sense already there" (58).
What are the logical implications of representing 
knowledge as inherent and learning as an unfolding? M. H.
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Abrams has questioned the horticultural foundation of 
Coleridge's organic imagination: "For if the growth of a
plant seems inherently purposeful, it is a purpose without 
an alternative, fated in the seed, and evolving into its 
final form without the supervention of consciousness [my 
emphasis]" (173). William K. Wimsatt has exposed this same 
flawed logic. He reveals how Coleridge, in his assessment 
of Shakespeare's dramas, does "a double step away" from the 
idea that organic form can be accomplished with "vegetable 
imagery" (67). According to Wimsatt, Coleridge concedes 
that Shakespeare's art was a conscious art— that is, he 
acknowledges that Shakespeare's dramas did not grow like 
plants: Coleridge says that a "man would be a dreamer, who
otherwise than poetically should speak of roses and lilies 
as self-conscious subjects [original emphasis]" (qtd. in 
Abrams 173).
Scott Harshbarger has specifically addressed 
composition's use of natural images. Criticizing Berlin 
and Knoblauch and Brannon for their tendency to wrap their 
theories in green, growing images, he questions whether 
"'the plant' ought to be the paradigmatic metaphor for 
modern conceptions of the composing process" (1). When 
theorists couple writers with plants, he says, the idea of 
students making conscious decisions "can seem little more 
than an interrupt ion of the 'natural process'" (5).
Insofar as process theorists adopt organic metaphors
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because they wish to extricate composition from the grip of 
a mechanistic skills model, Harshbarger's words reveal the 
irony of such a strategy: "Thus the possibility of freedom
from external rules which dynamic organicism seems to 
promise is bought at the expense of submission to 
impersonal forces operating from within . . ." (5).
Creativity tied to Coleridge's plant analogy
eventually must confront the problem Rosenthal, Abrams,
Wimsatt, Harshbarger and others have seen with the organic
metaphor: the plant is "fated in the seed" (Abrams 173),
that is, fated to "grow" and develop without conscious
intent, its destiny "inevitable and inexorable" (Thorslev
99). Unlike the growing rose or lily, which is genetically
fated to develop inevitably and inexorably, students'
cognitive endeavors are acts of consciousness. A student
in the act of composing has what no plant or animal
possesses: "a capacity for self-revision, rearrangement,
mending" (Wimsatt 68). As Wimsatt reminds us,
Plants renew leaves and flowers; animals moult in 
several ways; a lobster can lose a claw and 
regrow it; the human body heals cuts and regrows 
a finger nail. But there is no action of any 
physical organism that remotely approaches the 
power of the human mind to revise and recast 
itself [original emphasis]. (68)
The product of a creative imagination, then, does not grow
like lilies or roses; it is an "act of a self-reflexive
consciousness" (Wimsatt 72).
Are these organic impulses derived from a Romantic 
conception of the imagination? While it is true that 
Dewey uses Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Wordsworth and 
Emerson in defining creativity, that Berlin refers to 
Emerson as the founder of two branches of process 
composition, that Rohman and Wlecke use Abrams's 
interpretation of Coleridge to develop their pre-writing 
experiment, and that Willinsky employs the British 
Romantics as a foundation for his writing and reading 
assumptions, I believe these theories— though conceived by 
these educators as "Romantic"— -are actually organic. Even 
Coleridge, the most organic of the Romantics, speaks in 
both an organic voice of identification and an allegorical 
voice of separation.
De Man has studied Coleridge's voice of separation.
He argues that Abrams reads a passage from Coleridge as 
"limiting the task of the mind to interpreting what is 
given in nature"— a reading that would indicate that 
Coleridge recognizes nature as prior; however, says de Man, 
Abrams in the same paragraph uses passages from Coleridge 
and Wordsworth that advocate the "self over nature" (RT 
182). Though Coleridge apparently advocates symbolic 
identification between humanity and nature, critics like de 
Man and those who have followed de Man's argument in "The 
Rhetoric of Temporality"3 have seen his attitude as much 
more tenuous and equivocal.
Other than Coleridge's attempts to distinguish between 
the mechanical fancy and the organic imagination, what 
comprises the Romantic definition of imagination? In an 
earlier chapter, I spoke of Hartman's argument that the 
Romantics do not wish organic union with nature but a 
separation from nature so that their imagination might 
transcend nature ("Romanticism” 49). In reading 
Wordsworth's The Prelude. Hartman identifies the Romantic 
imagination as "growth toward independence of immediate 
stimuli"; the mind is thus "a power separate from nature," 
a power of the poet to "feel as if by his own choice. or 
from the structure of his mind [my emphasis] " ("Romance" 
292). If we accept Hartman's interpretation, then, any 
educational interpretation of imagination as organically 
identified with nature might more appropriately be called 
"organic" rather than "Romantic."
Defining theories of creativity as "Romantic" is 
difficult because, as Hartman has shown, the Romantics 
never conceptua1ized their theories of art and never gave 
"an adequate definition of the function of art"
("Romanticism” 50). Like Hartman, de Man describes the 
Romantics' concept of imagination as one not based on 
identity with nature but one founded on "a possibility for 
consciousness to exist entirely by and for itself, 
independently of all relationships with the outside world, 
without being moved by an intent aimed at a part of this
world " (IS 16). The Romantics' recognition of language 
and self-consciousness and their belief that art should 
issue from a mind independent of nature are ideas that 
complicate attempts to call the Romantic theory of 
imagination "organic” or, more significantly, complicate 
attempts to link educational organicism with Romanticism.
Dewey's Vital Process
The IMAGINATION, then, I consider either as 
primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I 
hold to be the living power and prime agent of 
all human perception. . . . The secondary I 
consider as an echo of the former, coexisting 
with the conscious will, . . . differing only in 
degree. and in the mode of its operation. . . . 
it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is 
essentially vital, even as all objects fas 
objects) are essentially fixed and dead.
FANCY, on the contrary, has no other 
counters to play with but fixities and definites. 
The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of 
memory . . . .  modified by that empirical 
phenomenon of the will which we express by the 
word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary 
memory it must receive all its materials ready 
made from the law of association [original 
emphasis]. (Coleridge 396-97)
I have quoted part of Coleridge's definition of 
imagination as he distinguishes it from fancy because 
organicist educators tend to follow the Coleridgean 
distinction between the vital growth of imaginative process 
and the fixed properties of thinking derived from conscious 
choices, will, and memory. In the twentieth century, the 
idea of thinking as process owes much to Dewey; however, it
is process as Dewey defines it aesthetically, not
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instrumentally, that is the subj ect of my study. Moreover, 
it is the aesthetic process, as Dewey interprets it in Art 
as Experience, that is congenial to organic writing 
pedagogies.
The actual pairing of John Dewey with some form of 
process writing theory— be it transactional or 
expressionistic— has been made by numerous authorities. 
George Hillocks associates what he calls "natural process" 
writing with Dewey (247); James Kinneavy believes Dewey's 
theory of art influenced expressionistic composition (14); 
Margaret Mathieson demonstrates that by 1905 Dewey's ideas 
had influenced the British to convert to an expressionistic 
writing emphasis (58-59); and Berlin's comprehensive 
historiographies of rhetoric place Dewey at the beginning 
of process writing (RR 46-47; 50-51).4 Process rhetoric, 
with Dewey as an antecedent, calls on the process of 
writing as a way of creative discovery, the emphasis being 
on process and not on product.5
When Dewey's fellow Progressive, Harold Rugg, 
published The Child-Centered School in 1948, process 
rhetoric in either of its Progressive strands—  
transactional (social emphasis) and expressionistic 
(individual emphasis)-— was essentially active only in the 
public schools, the objective philosophy having gained 
supremacy in American colleges (RR 46). In the following 
passage, fairly typical of a Progressive public school
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emphasis on expression and process, Rugg demonstrates the
organic concern for the "unfolding" of the inner, "latent,"
and "hidden powers" of students:
. . .  we must reiterate that is is not for the 
sake of the product that our schools are setting 
up a regime of creative effort. It is for the 
sake of educating youth in the creative process 
. . . . The result . . . will be measured in 
terms of the unfolding of the personalities of 
children, not in terms of the painting produced, 
the verse written, the measure composed . . . .  
[I]t is the discovery of latent hidden powers, 
reserves of artistic emotion . . . that is the 
true goal of the new education. The truly 
creative act . . . leads to the discovery of new 
powers within one's self and brings about a 
widespreading sense of release. (Child 285)
These organic emphases— the unfolding process, the 
inner powers, the reserves of emotion— originate from an 
organic notion of imagination. Thorslev says that 
Coleridge couples the primary imagination with creative, 
organic, and unconscious powers and links the secondary 
imagination with powers which, though conscious, still 
treat creativity as being derived from "deeper wells."
These unconscious or deeper sources, Thorslev surmises, 
were contrasted by Coleridge with the fancy, which he saw 
as fully conscious but mechanical (90). Rugg himself, 
however, makes little distinction between Coleridge's 
primary imagination and secondary imagination, saying that 
they are "but two phases of one continuous organic process" 
which constitutes "the eternal act of creation"
(Imagination 197).
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That Dewey, like Rugg, organically conceived 
creativity is best reflected in his description of an act 
of expression as involving "subconscious maturation" 
without "direct effort of 'wit and will'"— a process that 
involves purposes "below the level of intention" and 
results in something "born almost in spite of conscious 
personality and certainly not because of its deliberate 
will" (AE 73). Though I will couple Dewey's ideas of 
organic process with theories of rhetoric, Dewey himself 
never developed a philosophy specifically tailored to the 
act of composing. Art as Experience, however, is a full 
rendering of Dewey's concepts of creativity. In that study 
Dewey says that imagination should not be "treated as a 
special and self-contained faculty" but should be judged a 
"quality that animates and pervades all processes of making 
and observation" (267). Dewey's aesthetic views,6 then, 
seem appropriate when searching for the evolution of 
organic conceptions that mark specific process discourses.
Alexander deems a "very radical feature" of Dewey's 
philosophy to be his idea that "experience is not primarily 
cognitive," though "knowing may play a significant role" 
(185). When Dewey considers the matter and substance of 
the arts, he speaks of the unity of a work of art, saying 
that unity can "only be felt," "can only be emotionally 
intuited" (192) and that the "sense of things as belonging 
together. . . is immediate" and "cannot be a product of
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reflection" (194). Though he does not say that poetry is 
more physical than intellectual, he adds, "But it's more 
than intellectual . . . " (216). Passages such as these 
validate Alexander's assertion that Dewey refused "to 
understand the aesthetic as a form of cognitive experience" 
(32) .7
While Dewey does not attribute creativity to the
workings of Spirit, he experiences difficulty in
analytically examining creative acts which he believes
emanate from non-cognitive ways of thinking.8 For example,
when Dewey analyzes an expressive act, he speaks of
unconscious intent and the absence of will and surmises
that the creative act is a kind of possession:
The direct effort of "wit and will" of itself 
never gave birth to anything that is not 
mechanical . . . .  Yet as they [different 
purposes, acts] all proceed from one living 
creature they are somehow bound together below 
the level of intention. They work together, and 
finally something is born almost in spite of 
conscious personality, and certainly not because 
of its deliberate will. When practice has done 
its perfect work, the man is taken possession of 
by the appropriate muse and speaks and sings as 
some god dictates. (AE 73)
Thorslev argues that the organic mind is
. . . not analytic, logical, skeptical, or 
self-consciously deliberative. [It] is not the 
scientific or the philosophic mind, but an 
organic, dynamic mind, a mind forever in motion, 
in process. It is indeed creative, but creative 
as is Coleridge's primary imagination, not 
consciously or deliberately. (98-99)
Dewey's belief in creative acts as "more than
intellectual," as proceeding "below the level of
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intention," and as being born "almost in spite of conscious 
personality" demonstrates an organic concept of 
imagination. When he proposes that will of itself produces 
nothing but the mechanical, he endorses Coleridge's idea of 
the mechanistic fancy limited by its restriction to will 
and conscious choice.
Throughout Art as Experience Dewey alludes to the 
rhythms of organic process. Experience has form because 
there is "dynamic organization," because, says Dewey, "it 
is a growth" (55). This dynamism is reflected in the poem 
or drama's "self-movement" (70). Like the inner-directed 
movement of a "live creature," the work of art moves in a 
"developing process," the artist finding "where he is going 
because of what he has previously done; that is, the 
original excitation. . . undergo[es] successive 
transformation" (111). Should energy fail to move in 
rhythmic, natural process, it becomes "inchoate, 
mechanical, or loose and diffuse" (157). The onward 
movement of process should be like the "onward waves of the 
sea," not "compelled by outside necessities" (172).
Closing the Book and Blossoming
"It is consciousness," says Thorslev, "which splits, 
analyzes, distinguishes, and separates us, even alienates 
us, from other men and above all from the continuity of 
organic nature" (91); as a result, Thorslev concludes, the
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organicist9 is involved in a retreat from consciousness, 
which manifests itself in two ways: in anti-
intellectualism and in an emphasis on spontaneity and 
"naturalness of expression and action, unmediated by 
deliberation or conscious judgment" (93) . Among those 
subjects Thorslev finds most likely to be considered by 
organicists as spontaneous and natural are subhuman nature 
(animals) and children.
In a passage near the end of the first chapter of Art 
as Experience. Dewey reflects on the unified activities of 
the fox, the dog, and the thrush whose retention of the 
past and whose anticipation of the future give them 
"directions in the present" (19). Like Emerson's rose and 
Whitman's "placid, self-contained animals," Dewey's animals 
live in the present. Unlike humankind, the fox, dog, and 
thrush do not utilize the past as a model "upon which to 
draw" but, instead, use the "past absorbed into the 
present" (19).
Insofar as Dewey recognizes the separation of self- 
conscious human beings from unselfconscious nature—  
represented in his acknowledgment that "thought withdraws 
us from the world" (19) — -he appears to echo the allegorical 
voice of Emerson. However, Dewey's organic voice is 
dominant: instead of recognizing the irreparable division
brought about by thought— that is, that the fox's unity can 
never be duplicated by human beings— -he sees, instead, a
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rhythmic developing.10 From the animals' unified actions, 
Dewey concludes that . experience is heightened
vitality"; it "affords our sole demonstration of a 
stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and 
developing [my emphasis]" (19). To a Romantic, Dewey's 
fox, thrush, and dog— unencumbered by the burden of 
thought-— represent a stability human beings cannot hope to 
achieve.
But to Dewey, an experience of heightened vitality 
replicates the unity of the animals by releasing the human 
being from the confines of "one's own private feelings" so 
that organic "interpenetration of self and the world" 
results (AE 19). To one who is fully alive, the future, 
Dewey thinks, is not dreaded but holds promise; like the 
live creature, a fully alive human being is in process or 
is becoming, for "[i]n a finished world, sleep and waking 
could not be distinguished" (AE 17). Experience as 
"heightened vitality" demonstrates "active and alert 
commerce with the world" (AE 19) In Dewey's view, then, 
experience and art, like language, release us from isolated 
subjectivity and organically connect us to the world. This 
view is, of course, the opposite of the Romantic idea that 
language and self-consciousness do, in fact, create the gap 
between subject and object. Dewey elevates literature over 
other arts not only because of its capacity for expressing 
"meanings to which we had been dumb" but also for its
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greater ability to make common "what has been isolated and 
singular,” thereby connecting "the one who utters” to 
"those who listen” (AE 244).
Dewey's understanding of experience as "heightened 
vitality”-— a vitality which is rhythmic and developing— is 
manifested in the expressive act, which, if not actually 
spontaneous, appears to be spontaneous; he draws his model 
of this spontaneity from nature and from playing children. 
Though Dewey considers language a tool, a "practical 
device” (AE 215), he believes that language sometimes falls 
short of representing nature. At such times experience 
itself, he argues, should suffice. Ever the reconciler, 
Dewey concludes that experience does not need 
"reduplication in language" (AE 215). This privileging of 
organic connection, which occurs in experience if not 
always in language, is manifested in Dewey's preference for 
experience-— such as that demonstrated in the live 
creature's organic activities or in the play of children—  
over the secondhand experience in books.11
Spontaneity in an expressive act, Dewey explains, 
follows "complete absorption in subject matter" and is not 
actually an immediate outburst. Spontaneity, even though 
it may follow long reflection, will be manifested "if . . . 
matter has been vitally taken up into a present experience" 
(70); he gives two examples of natural spontaneity: the
rhythmical movement of happy children and the volcano's
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eruption. Though the volcano's "outburst" looks 
spontaneous, Dewey points out that it "presupposes a long 
period of prior compression"; significantly, Dewey finds 
that this long incubation results in a unified mass of 
lava, not in "separate rocks and ashes" (71). The 
rhythmical movements of children, like the mass of lava and 
the unified actions of animals, issue from a "union of 
something stored from past experience, something therefore 
generalized, with present conditions"; this unison, he 
says, is rarer with "maturer persons. "12 The adult's 
expressive act, however, "may issue with the spontaneity of 
the cadenced speech or rhythmic movement of happy 
childhood" (71-72).
In Dewey's aesthetics and in the work of the organic 
process theorists, the privileging of the "natural," the 
spontaneous, the intuitive, and the internal at times 
results in an elevation of the child (and, simultaneously, 
in a diminished role for the teacher). Willinsky's 
expressive writing theory is centered on the "child's 
unconscious genius which requires only a writerly 
opportunity to bring it into play" (NL 193). His New 
Literacy writing gives primary consideration to the 
"experience of children and the natural power of their 
minds to find their own way"; once this responsibility has 
been shifted from the external authority of the teacher to 
the child's own interior, he says, " . . .  children can be
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said to be responsible, by this act of writing, for their 
own intellectual stimulation" (NL 192). Willinsky's 
philosophy recognizes writing as an unfolding of the 
student's natural ability. Though he wishes to emphasize 
the social scene of writing,13 he, at the same time, urges 
that students be "engaged in figuring things out on an 
informal and personal level" (NL 42) and that meaning 
should begin "within" (NL 46). With his conceptual 
movement of the teacher from a mechanistic to an organic 
figuration, Willinsky envisions a writing philosophy that 
will stimulate a "flowering of thought": "Not only is
writing to come that much easier and more powerfully for 
. . . the New Literacy by turning to the organic metaphor, 
this writing will serve to awaken and advance the mind" (NL 
192-93).
Knoblauch and Brannon, like Dewey and Willinsky, 
assign the child superior powers. They argue that "no 
technical virtuosity" is needed to "put the 'pieces' of 
language together"; therefore, they believe "no deliberate 
learning is required before people are able to respond 
grammatically to the world, a fact borne out by simple 
observation of the complexly fluent verbal performance of 
young children" (88). Because they consider these 
abilities "natural," Knoblauch and Brannon are perhaps the 
most anti-instructional of the organicist rhetoricians. 
Insofar as writers "naturally" organize by the modes
utilized in objective rhetorics; that is, they "naturally11 
define, compare, classify, and so on, they do not, 
according to Knoblauch and Brannon, need textbooks or 
teachers. They argue that it is "the teacher's need to 
tell, more than the students' need to know, that motivates 
skill-based instruction." As do many organic process 
theorists, Knoblauch and Brannon define the writing 
teacher's role as "facilitator," for "[t]eachers can 
facilitate maturation of a natural capacity, but they 
cannot control growth by means of their pedagogy" (94).
The teacher's role, then, is a "peripheral role of 
nurturing a competence" and providing a context because 
teachers "can't create thinkers and writers after their own 
image" (94).
Because he thinks students should find within 
themselves their own method and process, Willinsky insists 
that they not follow teachers, "who do not think enough of 
it [the method] to try it themselves" (NL 45). Linking his 
pedagogy to Illich and 1960s deschooling, Willinsky wishes 
a teacher's learning to "circulate" authority throughout 
the class "rather than lord it over them" (NL 52). He 
describes a New Literacy pedagogy that "shift[s] the 
educational authority from . . . the experience and 
knowledge of the teacher to . . . those qualities in the 
student" (NL 192). His inspiration for students' finding 
their own way is the Romantic poet Wordsworth, who,
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Willinsky says, valued "experience and the inspirational 
power of time spent reflectively alone without a teacher 
except Nature" (NL 192). Because he reads in "Ode: 
Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early 
Childhood" that Wordsworth "unrestrainedly celebrates" the 
child, Willinsky sees a rationale for a child-centered 
writing curriculum.
The organicist's privileging of the child is not, 
however, the Romantic notion of the child's superiority. 
Willinsky reads the Romantics as exalting childhood, and he 
uses his reading of Wordsworth as an inspiration for his 
students' writing. But Wordsworth's "Intimations Ode" 
looks wistfully to childhood only because of the child's 
unselfconscious, unified relationship with nature. In the 
"Ode" Wordsworth's child appears among nature's beauty, 
seemingly clothed in "a celestial light" (1. 4 ) . The poet 
looks back wistfully and concludes that he no longer 
possesses unity with nature. This "original relation" that 
the child enjoys convinces the poet that "a glory" has 
passed from the earth. The verses, however, do not 
celebrate the child but the unselfconscious state of the 
child.
As in The Prelude and "Tintern Abbey," the ode 
appraises the three stages of the speaker's separation from 
nature: the child, who is still connected to nature; the
youth, who daily travels "farther from the East"; and the
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Man, who "perceives it die away" (5). In stanza eight 
Wordsworth refers to the child as the "best philosopher," 
the appellation that Willinsky uses in grounding his 
process approach. However, Wordsworth's characterizing the 
child as having an immense soul and as being an "eye among 
the blind" is indicative of his belief that the child has 
what the mature poet does not have: unity with nature.
The poet yearns for "those first affections/ Those shadowy 
recollections," but he concludes that he appreciates nature 
even more than he had in childhood. The speaker appears 
reconciled, but when he reveals that the most ordinary 
flower that blooms gives him "thoughts that do often lie 
too deep for tears," we realize the depth of his 
alienation. Willinsky reads the Romantics as idealizing 
childhood, but what Wordsworth actually ponders is the loss 
of his former "selfless self."
Organic Form: Rose, Lilies, and Stones
To the organicist vital process is realized 
"naturally," without outside direction or manipulation. 
Throughout their examinations of creativity, organic 
educators extol the primacy of inner thought, intuition, 
and intrinsic form. This privileging of intrinsic over 
extrinsic is what Crowley believes to be the "fundamental 
opposition that entered into the inaugural gesture of 
metaphysics: inside/outside" (12). To the organicist
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plumbing the mystery of creativity, "inside” is infinitely 
preferable to "outside." As hallowed as the interior 
impulse toward creativity is the internal self-movement of 
organic process. Even though a period of "subconscious 
maturation" or "long compression" (AE 73) may precede 
production, Dewey believes creativity comes with little 
application of "direct effort of wit and will" and that its 
form is organic, that is, "inherent, not imposed from 
without" (AE 137). Organic creativity, then, is inner- 
directed, is driven "below the level of intention" (AE 73), 
and realizes its structure from germination within, not 
from outside mechanical imposition of structure.
In Coleridge's famous definition, organic form is 
innate:
The form is mechanic when on any given material 
we impress a predetermined form, not necessarily 
arising out of the properties of the material, as 
when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape 
we wish it to retain when hardened. The organic 
form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes as 
it develops itself from within, and the fullness 
of its development is one and the same with the 
perfection of its outward form. Such is the 
life, such the form. (Lectures 409)
Since he first defined creativity in genetic terms,
Coleridge's theory of organic form has had long-standing
influence in literature and criticism. Organic form is one
of the foundational tenets of the New Criticism, and
theories of creativity— from Dewey to the present time--
have incorporated its critical dicta.
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Poe told of his conscious intention in writing "The 
Raven," and Wimsatt saw a poem as an "act of a self­
reflexive consciousness," a conscious application of wit 
and will, but the organicist cannot acknowledge intention. 
De Man in "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism" 
says that if one attempts to define the difference between 
a stone and a chair, one must, in defining the manufactured 
object, specify its intended use, namely, that it is 
"destined to be sat on." But a natural object like a stone 
may be defined by the totality of its sensory appearances. 
Thus
by asserting a priori. . . that in literary 
language, the meaning is equal to the totality of 
the sensory appearances [as the New Critics 
asserted], one postulates in fact that the 
language of literature is of the same order, 
ontologically speaking, as a natural object. The 
intentional factor has been bypassed. (24)
New Critical and organic conceptions of creativity, then,
slight conscious intention and will because, in de Man's
interpretation, they confuse "intent," defining it as the
mental content of the poet's mind. But, says de Man,
intentionality is not something physical nor psychological,
"but structural" (FI 25). Though creative production is
"more complex," de Man believes that it follows this same
logic: " [T]he intentionality of the act, far from
threatening the unity of the poetic entity, more definitely
establishes this unity" (FI 25). He concludes that the New
Ill
Critics denied intentionality because it compromises their 
idea of organic form (FI 28).
Knoblauch and Brannon express their aversion to a
student's being required to consider an essay
mechanistically or in parts, that is, in stages or steps,
because they believe the form of an essay should grow like
a plant; they thus deny the value of writing that assumes a
predetermined form:
When discourse is conceived in organic terms, its 
. . . continuity is emphasized, its integrity as 
a whole, while the differentiation of parts is 
regarded as the product of analytical 
investigation, not as an a priori condition. The 
parts of an automobile precede the engine viewed 
as a whole; but the parts of a plant, stem, 
leaves, roots do not precede the plant as a 
whole. (85)
Knoblauch and Brannon think of a piece of writing as a 
plant whose parts are not to be differentiated, as an act 
without a priori analysis. In defining the composition as 
a plant, they cannot logically subscribe to an 
intentionality which would refute their organic metaphor. 
Intention belongs to the human being constructing the 
chair, the automobile, and "The Raven," not to a rose or a 
lily that is "fated in the seed" to grow inevitably and 
inexorably.
Dewey's Art as Experience is filled with allusions to 
the necessity of organic form in creative production. Like 
Knoblauch and Brannon, Dewey disavows external 
organization, which is inimical to the "ordering of a
growing experience . . . invol[ving] . . . the whole of a 
live creature toward a fulfilling conclusion" (81). 
Elsewhere, he says the organization of an act of expression 
should not be "impelled by outside necessities," as it 
often is in ordinary life, but by "an onward motion like 
that of waves of the sea" (AE 172). He defines form as 
"the operation of forces that carry the experience of an 
event. object, scene. and situation to its own integral 
fulfillment [original emphasis]" (AE 137).
This organic unity, Dewey suggests, exists in a poem 
if the subject matter of the poem has first been 
"poetically felt" in "such a unified and massive way as to 
determine its own development, that is its specification 
into distinctive parts [my emphasis]" (AE 192). Should 
those parts appear in the finished work as parts or "seams 
and mechanical junctions," Dewey says it is "because the 
substance is not controlled by a permeating quality" (AE 
192). This quality that must appear in all the parts and 
contribute to a "sense of totality" can "only be felt"; it 
"cannot be a product of reflection" (AE 192-94). Even 
though arduous labor might precede the final production of 
a poem or drama, Dewey maintains that its movement is a 
"self-movement" because "prior labor" fuses freshly with a 
new emotion (AE 70). He describes this unified 
organization as "dynamic . . . because it is a growth" (AE
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Rohman and Wlecke's 1960s experimental work in 
expressionistic process was founded on characteristics of 
the plant.14 Like Dewey, Rohman and Wlecke stress dynamic 
growth of parts, a totality of effect, and internal, rather 
than external, organization. They tell their students that 
their essays "ought to be thought of as growing into an 
organized whole from the dynamic encounter of the writer's 
mind with his seed-idea" (56). The seed-idea is central to 
Rohman and Wlecke's idea of process and organic unity, for 
the "single compelling insight" or seed-idea necessary to 
organic form is also what drives the process (56-58). The 
seed-idea is powerful enough, Rohman and Wlecke believe,
"to beget other ideas," which develop "inevitably" but "not 
necessarily logically" into yet other ideas which have "the 
power, like the plant, of assimilating . . . elements that 
can be included in the total organism of the essay" (57- 
58) .
The totality that Rohman and Wlecke wish to see 
demonstrated in student essays is described as "a sense of 
the 'growth' of a 'seed idea' or single theme,
'exfoliation' of an argument or proof, 'fruition' in the 
totality of the essay" (131). Because the whole is a 
"growing" whole, it cannot be viewed as "static" or 
"finished" (131). It is in process, becoming. For 
Knoblauch and Brannon, "form emerges— the sense of a whole 
with integrated parts or aspects" (85). By "form," they
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mean "a fabric," "a texture," "a continuity" but not some 
"conventional shape like a paragraph" (85). For Dewey, the 
self-movement of a poem represents "a universe in itself" 
and "a miniature whole"; the poem is "self-enclosed and 
self-limiting" and has "self-sufficiency" (AE 241). This 
miniature whole moves internally, organically, the "medium 
and its meaning seem[ing] to fuse as by a preestablished 
harmony," which Dewey attributes to the "music and euphony 
of words" (AE 242).
When educators organically define the creative 
imagination, their concept does not derive from what de Man 
calls "the main Romantic experience" but from Coleridge's 
theories of imagination and symbolic language.
Representing the imagination and language with the capacity 
to reconcile the division between writers and their acts of 
expression or between the natural world and human acts of 
conscious deliberation disregards Emerson's belief that 
language does not have the capacity to represent reality. 
And the attempt by theorists to ameliorate division by 
linking a student's idea with a seed or the essay with a 
plant is to pair a conscious act with an unconscious 
natural image and to offer the plant as liberating when its 
growth is fated and determined. Expressionists like Rohman 
and Wlecke and Willinsky and transactionalists like Berlin 
and Berthoff treat the act of composing as an unfolding; 
however, this kind of process theorizing fails to recognize
that writing is not organic but cognitive, an act of 
reflection which is always intentional. Images of seeds, 
fruit, roses, lilies, animals, and waves do not explain the 
creative imagination but offer, instead, mystification.
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Notes to Chapter 4
1. I wrote in Chapter Two of how a transactiona1ist like 
Debrah Rashcke pairs Emerson with the solipsism she fears 
is generated by expressionistic rhetoric and of how an 
expressionist like Mark Wiley attempts to relieve the 
expressionist focus on individual activity by promoting 
peer groups as small communities. Though Willinsky speaks 
of the process as beginning "within" (The New Literacy: 
Redefining Reading and Writing in the Schools, p. 46) and 
as "learning from oneself" (p. 35), he also labors to align 
his expressionism with "the social situation of the 
individual" (p. 55).
2. I have already mentioned Berlin's proclivity for the 
natural image; Knoblauch and Brannon's brand of 
transactionalism is also framed organically. Berlin places 
his own work in the epistemic transactional branch of 
process; he includes, among others, Winterowd, Crowley, and 
Berthoff; however, though Knoblauch and Brannon claim this 
same orientation, he sees them as expressionists who 
understand composing as "the expression of the isolated 
self" (p. 185, Rhetoric and Reality).
3. Kronick demonstrates how Coleridge in Essays on the 
Principles of Method uses allegory to explain the mind's 
power for symbolizing; however, though the narrative 
indicates the possibility of man's retracing "the path 
leading man away from unity" (resulting in a reuniting of 
language and nature), the allegory "undoes itself" when it 
reveals unity left behind (pp. 64-64, American Poetics of 
History; From Emerson to the Moderns).
4. In Chapter Two, I noted Berlin's acquisition of 
Emerson for transactional composition and his 
acknowledgment of a similar expressionist claim. Dewey 
suffers from the same sort of tug-of-war: both 
transactionalists and expressionists claim him. Berlin 
says that early transactional rhetoric "was the most 
complete embodiment of John Dewey's notion of progressive 
education" (Rhetoric and Reality; Writing Instruction in 
American Colleges. 1900-1985. pp. 46-47). And he finds in 
Fred Newton Scott, a disciple of Emerson, a biographical, 
if not a philosophical, linkage to Dewey. According to 
Berlin, Scott and Dewey were colleagues at Michigan, and 
Scott taught a class in aesthetics for Dewey in the 
philosophy department there (RR, p. 47; Writing Instruction 
in Nineteenth-Centurv American Colleges, p. 56). It is 
apparent that Scott relished organic metaphors quite as 
much as Berlin and Dewey. In an early text Scott and 
colleague Joseph Villiers Denny argue that writing should 
not be thought of "as a dead form. . . but a living
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product" and that a paragraph is like a plant "springing up 
in the soil of the mind from a germinal idea" (qtd. in 
Berlin, WI, p. 84).
5. In the 1960s, Jerome Bruner's emphasis on process 
stimulated a renewal of process rhetoric in universities 
(Berlin, RR, p. 122). However, it would be difficult to 
distinguish how much of this revival was inspired by Bruner 
or by Dewey, whose work had kept process alive in public 
schools while it faded away on the college level (RR, p.
46). Berlin admits his bias toward the transactional 
(epistemic) process model (and its "Romantic," Emersonian- 
inspired nineteenth-century manifestation in Scott's work). 
Berlin's narrative describes the attempts of David-like 
process rhetorics challenging the Goliath-like current- 
traditional model (the prevalent writing theory for the 
past 150 years). He metaphorically represents the current- 
traditional theory as a mechanistic, assembly-line, 
product-oriented epistemology (Berlin, WI, p. 29; p. 83); 
the process theories he defines in plant metaphors.
Berlin has told of how Scott's inaugural attempt to 
launch an early (1890s) alternative to the current- 
traditional philosophy failed on the college level.
In the Progressive-influenced and Dewey-inspired years of 
1920-1940, the popularity in public schools of both the 
transactional (with its emphasis on the "social nature of 
human experience") (RR, p. 58) and the expressionistic 
(with its accent on individualistic self-expression) 
reflected the two tributaries of Progressive education, 
which Berlin says Dewey attempted to reconcile (RR, p. 59). 
Dewey is, therefore, frequently cited as the precursor of 
both rhetorics.
In the 1960s, with Rohman and Wlecke as revival 
figures, process writing (in an expressionistic form) 
reappeared in a university setting. Other process 
theorists treated in this study— Willinsky and Knoblauch 
and Brannon— currently endorse some form of an 
expressionistic, transactional blend of process.
6. Dewey is careful in distinguishing between the 
aesthetic experience of consuming— -"appreciating, 
perceiving, and enjoying"— and that of actual producing—  
the making of a poem or a painting (AE 47). Still, as is 
frequently the case with Dewey, he strains to effect a 
reconciliation. Though appreciation and production are 
different acts, " [t]o be truly artistic, a work must also 
be esthetic— that is, framed for enjoyed receptive 
perception. Constant observation is, of course, necessary 
for the maker while he is producing" (AE 48).
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7. Jose Rosario demonstrates a similar belief in Rugg, 
who, he says, viewed the imagination as the "key to an 
understanding of knowing and creation as basic processes 
underlying the generation of all knowledge" (see "Harold 
Rugg on How We Come to Know: A View of His Aesthetics" in
Contemporary Curriculum Discourses, p. 347).
8. Rosario credits Rugg with early recognition of the 
"constraints of pragmatism" (p. 350) while simultaneously 
accusing Dewey of failing "to explain what was 
psychologically possible and perhaps necessary in a 
creative and liberating experience" (p. 351). Leroy 
Troutner also finds Dewey's pragmatism "inadequate" in 
explaining "man's subjectivity" (qtd. in Rosario, p. 351). 
Even so staunch a defender of Dewey as Thomas Alexander 
(John Dewev's Theory of Art. Experience & Nature) concedes 
a deficiency in Dewey's failure to articulate the 
"relationship between his description of aesthetic 
experience and his instrumenta1ism" (p. 184). Alexander, 
however, argues that Dewey's theory of experience is basic 
to both his instrumenta1ism and his aesthetics (p. 184).
Rugg, however, (even in the posthumously published 
culmination of his research on creativity, Imagination. 
1963) fails to acknowledge Dewey's treatment of creativity 
in Art as Experience. a study that came late in Dewey's 
career (Rosario, p. 357).
9. While Thorslev believes organicism to be the 
distinguishing characteristic of Romanticism, I have argued 
differently. The retreat from consciousness that he 
describes is part of the separation I have earlier 
attributed to the Romantic awareness of disunity. The 
organicist, however, disavows any irreparable separation in 
identifying with nature.
10. "Becoming" represents process to the organicist; to 
the Romantic it represents human instability as opposed to 
nature's essence: Emerson's rose is; human beings are 
becoming. To an organicist like Dewey or Willinsky, 
becoming engenders positive process. Willinksy adopts a 
philosophy of becoming and calls it "Romantic" on the basis 
of Morse Peckham's interpretation of Romanticism.
According to Willinsky, Peckham recognizes three dominant 
thought patterns in Romantic literature: a predeliction
for organic rather than mechanical metaphors, a philosophy 
of becoming rather than being, and a privileging of 
relationships rather than entities (qtd. in Willinsky, p. 
188, The New Literacy: Redefining Reading and Writing in
the Schools).
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11. The organic educator's emphasis on knowledge gained 
from experience rather than from teachers and books, as 
traditionally conceived, is commonly characterized as an 
element of "anti-intellectualism." Under a sub-heading 
titled "Questioning Authorities and Undoing the Book," 
Willinksy concedes that the New Literacy he advocates has 
inherited the ”anti-intellectualism” label from the 
Progressives; "the charge," he believes, "will always have 
a toehold on a movement which challenges the authority of 
the book" (The New Literacy, p. 199).
Dewey's philosophy has borne this label more than any 
other educator's. See Richard Hofstadter's 
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1962) and Morton 
White's essay of that same year, "Reflections on Anti- 
Intellectualism. " Dewey's influence is implied in White's 
treatment, but Hofstadter devotes over fifty pages to Dewey 
and what he considers to be his negative impact on American 
education. When both studies were printed in 1962, about 
five years after Sputnik, American education was being 
criticized for its failure to teach hard science and logic 
— central concerns of the pure rationalist— at a time when 
the country appeared inclined toward rationalism as a 
"necessary" educational base.
Though Dewey does not refer to specific matters of 
curricula praxis in Art as Experience, his references to 
the wrong use of teachers and books are numerous and 
widespread throughout his work. For example, in How We 
Think (1910), Dewey praises the common man "with little 
schooling" because of his success in practical affairs (p. 
120); twenty-eight years later, he reiterates this 
sentiment in Experience and Education when he calls the 
educational deficit of the common man with "little 
schooling" a "positive asset" because the man has common 
sense and has learned from his experiences (p. 48).
Dewey believes a student who attempts to memorize a 
"simulated cut-and-dried copy of the logic of an adult" 
will find his own logical processes stultified (HWT, pp. 
79-80) and a student tied to a book will become a "parasite 
living on the secondhand experience of others (HWT, pp. 79- 
80). Books, he says, are "the chief representatives of the 
lore and wisdom of the past (EE, pp. 18-19). In both 
Democracy and Education and How We Think, he finds books, 
as traditional education uses them, negatives, rejecting 
"bookishness" (DE, p. 232) and advising students to avoid 
the "paths already trodden in the book" (HWT, p. 264).
12. Though rarer, unity achieved by mature persons is, 
Dewey believes, "on a deeper level and with a fuller 
content of meaning" (AE 72).
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13. Throughout The New Literacy. Willinsky confronts the 
old Progressive tension between focusing on individual 
self-expression or on the communal and social. He is an 
expressionist in his writing philosophy. However, as an 
organicist, he feels an attraction for the organic whole. 
Organicists often place emphasis on "collectivism rather 
than on individualism" (Thorslev, Romantic Contraries, p. 
90) .
14. Rohman and Wlecke structure their pre-writing 
experiment on M. H. Abrams's five characteristics of plant 
life as it differs from mechanical systems. Abrams's 
characteristics evolve out of his analysis of Coleridge's 
"founding image" of "the distinction between the root 
analogies of machine and growing plant" (p. 170, The Mirror 
and the Lamp).
CHAPTER 5
OTHERNESS IN INTERPRETATION: TRIADIC DIALOGUE
An organic reading pedagogy, such as that recommended 
by John Willinsky, looks upon literature as an occasion for 
confirming and consolidating identity: the self seeks and
discovers in the mirrored representation of literature 
sameness. This discovery should, then, according to an 
organicist like Willinsky, be shared with a community of 
readers; reading, in this model, becomes an implement of 
organic connection— of self with self and of self with 
others. What I propose as an alternative to this 
organicism is a model derived from Felman's reading of 
Lacan— one which promotes not sameness and mirrored 
reflection but difference. This Lacanian model is triadic 
rather than dyadic in its configuration of teacher, 
student, and Otherness. In the discourse driven by this 
triad, student and teacher discover neither self-knowledge 
nor self-confirmation but difference: the discovery of
unconscious knowledge, the discovery of what they did not 
know they knew.
While Willinsky moves the teacher to the periphery and 
defines his or her role as that of inspirational leader, 
the teacher in the Lacanian model is part of a
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configuration which features no center but which attempts 
to access new knowledge denied to our conscious discourse. 
While Willinsky believes that critical judgments derive 
from emotional responses to literature and that students 
should not engage in an analysis of what he calls the 
"artifact," a Lacanian pedagogy would insist on the 
impossibility of subjective interpretation and would 
require that students closely examine the text in their 
active production of meaning.
Willinsky7s model for teaching literature parallels 
the organicism of his writing pedagogy. But perhaps even 
more than in his model of expressionist writing,
Willinsky7s teacher becomes an insubstantial, almost 
apparitional, figure assigned to the periphery of the 
classroom. Because he wishes an autonomous reader to 
derive his or her own meaning from a literary work rather 
than having it furnished by a teacher, he advocates 
"reading without teachers" (NL 85).1 His philosophical 
base is reader-response criticism, specifically reader- 
response theory as defined by David Bleich.2 From this 
reader-oriented pedagogy, Willinsky promotes reading that 
offers "pleasure, insight, and self-exploration" (NL 72), 
"engagement and self-expression" (NL 94), "a means of 
learning more about the world . . . outside of and within 
the student" (NL 97), and an occasion for "a deep level of
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engagement as well as expression of personal meaning" (NL 
105) .
Most of all, Willinsky believes reading should achieve 
"associations of self and community" (NL 108)— associations 
that result in what might be identified as the gist of 
Willinsky's organicist reading philosophy: connection. He
sees "education in literature becom[ing] an association 
among texts and readers" and argues that "in this way, 
response becomes connection" (NL 107). An education in 
literature, he believes, "makes bold strides toward the 
classic humanist call of 'only connect,' and it makes them 
through this essential connection" (NL 107).
In short, Willinsky's design advances the idea of 
students' engaging texts in search of personal meaning, 
self-exploration, and self-expression, with the ultimate 
goal being the organic integration of individual selves 
with the larger community. His reading theory assumes both 
the transparency of language and a centered subj ect; in 
arguing thus, he fails to acknowledge how language limits 
and defines the subjects he treats as autonomous. Speaking 
of the kind of intersubj ective communication and centered 
subject that Willinsky envisions, Catherine Belsey has 
said:
. . . the form of the classic realist text acts 
in conjunction with the expressive theory and 
with ideology by interpellating the reader as 
subj ect. . . . This model of intersubj ective 
communication, of shared understanding of a text 
which re-presents the world, is the guarantee not
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only of the truth of the text but of the reader's 
existence as an autonomous and knowing subject in 
a world of knowing subjects. In this way classic 
realism constitutes an ideological practice in 
addressing itself to readers as subjects, 
interpellating them in order that they freely 
accept their subjectivity and their subjection. 
(68-69)
As an alternative to the organicism Willinsky 
proposes, I suggest Shoshana Felman's Lacanian reading 
model, an asymmetrical model which differs from the 
traditional dyadic configuration by insinuating a third 
point— Otherness— representing a means of accessing the 
unconscious knowledge of both student and teacher. Using 
Freud and Lacan, Felman argues that a reading model built 
on the psychoanalytic relationship of analyst, analysand, 
and the unconscious— a triadic conf iguration of teacher, 
student, and Otherness— moves pedagogy from "the 
transmission of ready-made knowledge" to the "creation of a 
new condition of knowledge, the creation of an original 
learning disposition" (JL 81). With the addition of 
Otherness, both the teacher and the student gain access to 
knowledge outside themselves, that is, to knowledge outside 
their conscious knowledge and outside the duality of their 
relationship. Felman's pedagogy thus dispenses with the 
dualism Willinsky opposes but to which he can offer little 
other than a metaphysical notion of connection. Addressing 
the binary oppositions which organicist educators 
repetitively, and metaphysically, ask language and
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imagination to reconcile, Felman explains how a model of
asymmetrical reflexivity eliminates these dualisms:
By shifting and undercutting the clear-cut 
polarities between subject and object, self and 
other, inside and outside, analyst and analysand, 
consciousness and the unconscious, the new 
Freudian reflexivity substitutes for all 
traditional binary symmetrical conceptual 
oppositions— that is, substitutes for the very 
foundations of Western metaphysics— a new mode of 
interfering heterogeneity. (Felman JL 61)
Willinsky's reading model is caught up in the teacher- 
student or student-text dualisms which he reconciles with 
suggestions of merging and connecting; Felman, however,
"shifts and undercuts" these polarities with an Otherness, 
an "interfering heterogeneity," that works to bring 
unconscious thoughts of both student and teacher to 
conscious discourse. In an analytic reading model, the 
teacher's position is neither central (there is no center 
in this centerless model) nor peripheral because the 
triadic exchange eliminates centers. The teacher, then, 
like the student and the Otherness of the unconscious, 
occupies a position in the triad.
Organicists align students with plants, curriculum 
with flowering, and ideas with seeds, all the while 
insisting on their homogeneity. Felman's Lacanian model, 
however, insists not on identity but on difference, on 
Otherness. What a model attentive to Otherness brings to 
consciousness is something different, something the teacher 
and student do not identity with but recognize as something
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other-— something they never knew they knew. Gregory Jay 
says Otherness results when the teacher "brings unconscious 
defenses, desires into the realm of discourse . . . .  
Students then may discover how what they don't know that 
they think prevents them from knowing or thinking something 
else" (790). What Jay suggests is that thinking contains 
an element of ignorance or blindness. In a model 
recognizing Otherness, the aim of pedagogy becomes that of 
revealing how ignorance— what students don't know that they 
think— prevents their learning something else. A model 
like Willinsky's does not recognize how ignorance can teach 
because it is self-grounded: reading is self-reflection, a
vehicle for self-exploration, even self-confirmation. 
Inasmuch as Willinsky's pedagogy sanctions the essential, 
centered self of students, it cannot offer them what Felman 
urges— an "original learning disposition" (JL 81).
An organic, reader-centered interpretive framework
views learning as an organic, linear unfolding. But
Felman's psychoanalytic pedagogy moves on "breakthroughs,
leaps, discontinuities, regressions, and deferred action"
and raises doubts about the kind of organic wholism
Willinsky imagines:
. . . the unconscious, in Lacan's conception, is 
precisely the discovery that human discourse can 
by definition never be entirely in agreement with 
itself, entirely identical to its knowledge of 
itself, since, as the vehicle of unconscious 
knowledge, it is constitutively the material 
locus of a signifying difference from itself. 
(Felman, JL 77)
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Felman's theory moves interpretation from self-reflection,
which, she reminds us, is always a symmetrical and mirrored
reflection, to an asymmetrical, "revolving reflexivity": a
triadic, rather than dyadic, conf iguration. Felman's
addition of Otherness not only eliminates what Willinsky
fears— the reading teacher as dispenser of meaning— but,
more powerfully, argues that literature is more than a
substance to be dispensed. Inasmuch as "textual knowledge"
is "knowledge of the functioning of language . . .
knowledge at once derived from— and directed toward—
interpretation," Felman argues that it cannot be "acquired
(or possessed) once and for all" (JL 81). She draws a
parallel between the analytic and pedagogical structures.
The analyst, she maintains, has only textual knowledge that
offers no "ready-made interpretation" in any specific
patient's case:
While the analysand is obviously ignorant of his 
own unconscious, the analyst is doubly ignorant: 
pedagogically ignorant of his suspended (given) 
knowledge; actually ignorant of the very 
knowledge the analysand presumes him to possess 
of his own (the analysand's) unconscious: 
knowledge of the very knowledge he— the patient—  
lacks. (JL 82)
It is from the patient's speech, which "says much more than 
it knows, that the analyst will come to learn the patient's 
own unconscious knowledge. that knowledge which is 
inaccessible to itself. . . [original emphasis]" (JL 82).
Felman contrasts this psychoanalytic structure with 
the dialogic structure of the traditional classroom: in
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this conventional arrangement the teacher's question is 
answered by the other (the student) in a totally "expected" 
way. But Lacan argues that the "true Other. . . is the 
Other who gives the answer one does not expect" (qtd. in 
Felman, JL 82). The answer that is not expected— what 
Felman calls "new knowledge previously denied to 
consciousness" (JL 76)— is "that which comes as a surprise, 
that which is constitutively the return of a difference [my 
emphasis]" (JL 82). Felman explains how this new 
knowledge, which offers difference coming as a surprise, 
must come from an Other. An organic conception of reading 
recognizes only the ego, not the unconscious.
Robert Con Davis has contrasted Lacan's use of the 
early Freud with the later, or American, Freud: in the
earlier Freud preferred by Lacan, "the center of 
functioning . . .  is not the ego but the unconscious"; in 
the American Freud the ego is the center, "a substantial 
thing, the actual self of the person [original emphasis]" 
(751). Willinsky's model looks to reading as self­
expansion, offering greater engagement, exploration, and 
expression of the essential selves of reading students. 
Traditional pedagogy, such as that represented by the 
organicism of Willinsky, believes, as does American ego 
psychology, in "the illusion of individual autonomy" (McGee 
673) .
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The Lacanian Freud followed by Felman stresses,
however, what Davis calls "positioning.11 Pedagogy is,
Davis says, a
science of positioning, of understanding a 
student's relation to a dominant discourse, a 
discourse the student is constituted by as well 
as has an effect on. . . . a discourse [which] 
itself is unconscious [original emphasis]. (752)
What Davis calls "positioning," Felman refers to as "a
process that gives access to new knowledge previously
denied to consciousness [my emphasis]" (JL 76). Teaching,
then, becomes "the creation of a new condition of
knowledge, the creation of an original learning disposition
[my emphasis]" (Felman JL 80-81). With "positioning" and
"the creation of an original learning disposition,"
Felman's paradigm moves interpretation in literature from
Willinsky's appeal for seeking a personal connection with a
work to a discovery not of self (of either student or
teacher) but of the Otherness in each.
Willinsky's interpretive pedagogy lacks positioning, 
for he sees literature as a project of the reader's 
connecting the experience of the author with his or her own 
"personal history" (NL 106-07); students exit the course 
with much of what they brought in, never questioning their 
centered positions nor their relation to larger discourses 
that actually define them. They leave without questioning 
the reality of an "autonomy" that a pedagogy like 
Willinsky's promises them. They fail to discern what is
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actually an "illusion": the subject fails "to see beyond
the illusion of autonomy to the implication of the subject 
in cultural processes" (McGee 671). Instead, students 
remain in an illusory center without access to "an original 
learning disposition."
The Unconscious and Otherness
What does Felman mean by "Otherness," the third 
position in her model of triadic dialogue? Otherness does 
not issue from Willinsky's illusion of personal autonomy, 
nor does it emerge from what Felman refers to as the 
"traditional pedagogical dynamic," that is, from the 
teacher's conventional questioning of the student or from 
the student's request for information. Answers returned by 
both student and teacher in these traditional, symmetrical 
roles call for information and closure; answers to 
questions traditionally posed are, says Felman, "expected"
(JL 82), thus incapable of offering a return of the 
unexpected— the return of a difference or of "new 
knowledge." This is the mirrored, symmetrical duality that 
Felman distinguishes as essentially narcissistic (JL 126).
Otherness is not a part of this traditional 
pedagogical structure. Instead, Otherness develops out of
• • • a discourse that is other. or ex- 
centric. to the discourse of the self. It is, in 
effect, a discourse that is other to itself, not 
in possession of itself; a discourse that no 
consciousness can master and that no speaking 
subject can assume or own.
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The unconscious is a discourse that is 
radically intersubjective. Since it is a 
discourse that no consciousness can own, the only 
way a consciousness can hear it is as coming from 
the Other [original emphasis] . . . . (123)
If the discourse of the Other is "not in possession of
itself" and is a discourse "no consciousness can own," then
the Willinsky model, built on a "personal response" (NL
103) to literature and "on meaning that arises within
readers" (NL 106), is essentially self-reflective.
Willinsky's organic reading model assumes the subject's
presence and the similarity of self and its representation
in language. Derrida has spoken of the unconscious as
. . . differed— which no doubt means that it is 
woven out of differences, but also that it sends 
out, that is delegates, representatives, or 
proxies; but there is no chance that the 
mandating subj ect "exists" somewhere, that it is 
present or is "itself," still less that it will 
become conscious. . . . This radical alterity, 
removed from every possible mode of presence, is 
characterized by irreducible aftereffects, by 
delayed effects. (Speech 152)
These "representatives," "proxies," "aftereffects," or
"delayed effects" are what Otherness represents; they
manifest themselves in "unmeant knowledge that escapes
intentiona1ity" (Felman, JL 77), in dreams, in jokes, in
slips of the tongue and pen (Belsey 131; Felman 22). This
"unmeant knowledge" is not readily available through a
pedagogy that fosters self-reflection. Freud speaks of
this knowledge that "escapes intentionality":
. . .  A part of the activity of your own mind has 
been withdrawn from your knowledge and from the 
command of your will. . . you are using one part
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of your force to fight the other part. . . A 
great deal more must constantly be going on in 
your mind than can be known to your 
consciousness. Come, let yourself be taught, 
(qtd. in Felman, JL 75)
Felman sees in this explanation a pedagogical occasion, for
Freud speaks of a part of the mind being unavailable to
another part: it is "thus that psychoanalysis has sought
to educate the ego," to offer access to "new knowledge"
(JL 76).
Lacan uses the Freudian discovery of the unconscious 
to explain how a human subject, through induction into 
language, learns to "relate symbolically to other 
signifiers . . . to other humans and to articulate his own 
desire, his own unconscious, unawares" (Felman, JL 115). 
Lacan says that the unconscious is born at the moment the 
child acquires language (enters the symbolic order). 
According to Lacan, the child at first does not realize its 
own identity, but during the "Imaginary or mirror phase," 
it gains a dual perspective (of self and other). Belsey 
maintains this "'recognition' is an identification with an 
'imaginary' (because imaged) unitary and autonomous self" 
(60); this mirrored reflection represents both harmony and 
alienation to the child: its specular image represents
wholeness, yet the "I which is perceived and the I which 
does the perceiving" (Belsey 64) also demonstrate division. 
When the child enters the symbolic phase, represented by
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the father who stands for the law and the restriction
against incest, the child hears its
first author itat ive "no," the first imperative of 
renunciation, inaugurating, through this 
castration of the child's original desire, both 
the necessity of repression and the process of 
symbolic substitution of objects of desire, which 
Lacan calls "the Symbolic." (Felman, JL 104)
The child must deal with both desire and the law regulating
desire "through a linguistic structure of exchange."
Repeatedly, the child must replace and substitute symbolic
objects as substitutes of desire (JL 104).
Belsey says the Symbolic division reinforces the
alienation of the mirror or Imaginary phase: "There is
thus a contradiction between the conscious self, the self
which appears in its own discourse, and the self which is
only partly represented there, the self which speaks" (64-
65). As a result,
The unconscious comes into being in the gap which 
is formed by this division. The unconscious is 
constructed in the moment of entry into the 
symbolic order, simultaneously with the 
construction of the subject. The repository of 
repressed and pre-linguistic signifiers, the 
unconscious is a constant source of potential 
disruption of the symbolic order. (Belsey 65)
The child not only gains access to the "possibility of
social relations" with its newly discovered language
abilities, it also is able to voice its own needs and
wishes (Belsey 65). However, Belsey explains that " . . .
at the same time a division within the self is constructed"
because language "cannot by definition formulate those
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elements of desire which remain unconscious"; the subject 
thus becomes the "site of contradiction" (65)-—  
contradiction that manifests itself in what Derrida has 
called "aftereffects" and what Felman has designated as 
"unmeant knowledge" that "escapes intentionality" (JL 77).
Unconscious desire, then, "once repressed, survives in 
displaced symbolic media that govern the subject's life and 
actions without his ever being aware of their meaning 
. . . "  (Felman, JL 41)— -unconscious desire that comes to be 
"exposed" in language (JL 43). Felman associates what a 
subject does not remember "with repression, with the 
imperative to forget-— the imperative . . . not to admit to 
knowledge" (JL 79). Ignorance thus becomes "no longer 
simply opposed to knowledge: it is itself a very radical
condition, an integral part of the very structure of 
knowledge" (Felman, JL 78); ignorance, Felman insists, is 
"not a passive state of absence, a simple lack of 
information" but "an active refusal of information" and 
thus a "desire to ignore." And teaching, according to 
Felman, "has to deal not so much with lack of knowledge as 
with resistances to knowledge" (JL 79). Freud's great 
"discovery," she believes, was "in showing the ways in 
which ignorance can teach us something, become itself 
instructive" (JL 79). Barbara Johnson uses Socrates' 
words— "Most people are unaware that they do not know the 
true nature of the things they discuss"— and his avowal— "I
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know only that I am ignorant" (qtd. in "Teaching" 181)— to 
make the point that what we usually think of as knowledge 
"is really an array of received ideas, prejudices, and 
opinions-— a way of not knowing that one does not know 
[original emphasis]" ("Teaching" 180).
An analytically informed reading pedagogy, then, would 
focus interpretation on making ignorance informative, would 
examine the gaps and inconsistencies in texts, and would 
ask these questions; "Where does a text . . . precisely 
make no sense, that is, resist interpretation? Where does 
what I see and what I read resist my understanding?" 
(Felman, JL 80). Jay argues that a literature class may 
serve as "the occasion for [the] articulation" of these 
resistances: "what we resist knowing is intricately tied
to our constitution as social subjects. It is this 
structure of resistance that the student already 'knows' 
yet still needs to 'learn'. . ." (789).
What constitutes this repression, these unconscious 
desires? Though Felman states that the Oedipal question is 
central to analysis, she stresses that the question is "not 
necessarily" one "addressing analysands' desire for 
parents" but "a question addressing analysands' 
misapprehension, misrecognition . . . of their own history" 
(JL 129):
The subject's question in no way refers to the 
results of any specific weaning, abandonment, or 
vital lack of love or affection; it concerns the 
subject's history inasmuch as the subject
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misapprehends, misrecoanizes. it [original 
emphasis] . . . .  (JL 129)
Willinsky insists that students should find their own
personal meaning in what they read, but Felman says
that what can be read (and perhaps what should be 
read) is not just meaning but the lack of 
meaning; that significance lies not just in 
consciousness, but specifically, in its 
disruption . . . that the lack of meaning— the 
discontinuity in conscious understanding— can and 
should be interpreted as such, without 
necessarily being transformed into meaning. (JL 
45)
Not only does Willinsky believe that students should search 
for "personal meaning" and the "sense of a text's meaning" 
which "arises inside readers" (NL 106), he believes that 
they should do so in a virtually "teacherless" atmosphere. 
Felman, on the other hand, maintains that the unconscious 
cannot be accessed by one alone: the discourse of the
unconscious is "radically intersubjective" and accessible 
only by "coming from the Other" (JL 123).3 While the 
position of the Other in psychoanalytic dialogue is 
occupied by both the analyst and the unconscious of both 
patient and analyst, this position, pedagogically, would be 
occupied by the teacher and by the unconscious of both 
student and teacher (the Other representing the bringing to 
conscious dialogue of the unconscious thoughts of each). 
What Lacan has seen as "only apparently two-way" (qtd. in 
Felman 126) in the analytic dialogue should be "only 
apparently" dual in a reading pedagogy. In Felman's theory
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of reading, a "revolving reflexivity" emerges from the 
dynamic of teacher, student, and Otherness.
The Subject
In Willinsky's model, the subjective response of an 
autonomous reader is directed to a community of others 
where it is, theoretically, shared and works to connect 
reader and community. However, his reader's autonomy and 
freedom emerge from the duality of self-reflection (self 
reflecting self) and from the dualism of a self he sees as 
merging with community. Any unity recognized by Willinsky 
as originating from these dualities is, however, 
metaphysica1ly, not genuinely, realized. An organic theory 
of interpretation fails to acknowledge language and the 
discursive inscription of subjects (in Willinsky's ironic 
phrase) in "their place in the scheme of things" (NL 108). 
In his eagerness for connection, Willinsky ignores the 
implication of language and its role in producing the 
social, political, and economic positions we occupy in the 
"scheme of things": ironically, he says, " . . .  [R]eaders
need to see how that reading connects not just with 
themselves, but with their place in the scheme of things" 
(NL 108). In fact, language works with ideology to 
inscribe us in the scheme of things, but Willinsky's own 
reading model is oblivious to the implication of language 
in this inscription.
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Derrida has said that the subject "is inscribed in the 
language, that he is a 'function' of the language" (qtd. in 
Belsey 59). Speaking of the "oppositional relation" of the 
metaphysical notion of "self-identity" to "otherness," 
Derrida believes that the "other, as the other than self, 
the other that opposes self-identity, is not something that 
can be detected . . . with the aid of a philosophical lamp" 
(Interview, Kearney 117-18). However, reading literature 
"as language" will allow us, says Derrida, "to interrogate 
the covert philosophical and political presuppositions of 
institutionalized critical methods which generally govern 
our reading of a text" (original emphasis) (Interview, 
Kearney 125).
But Willinsky's organic reading model ignores the 
close textual analysis required to examine language and the 
critical methods that guide and determine our thinking. In 
fact, Willinsky's theory stresses "the literary experience" 
of reader and text "rather than an analysis of the 
artifact" (NL 95). Inasmuch as his organicist philosophy 
predisposes him to search for identity and similarity, 
Willinsky's reading theory overlooks the difference and 
Otherness in language. Belsey has said that "[w]ithin the 
existing ideology it appears "obvious" that people are 
autonomous individuals, possessed of subjectivity or 
consciousness which is the "source of their beliefs and 
actions"; it is what she says Althusser specifies as "the
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elementary ideological effect" (58). In Willinsky's
"teacherless" reading model, the idea of student autonomy
is what he assumes to be natural and obvious;
. . . the autonomy of the student is encouraged 
. . . .  the principal thing about reading is that 
you are to read for yourself, for the sense which 
books can make of, or add to, your own experience 
and understanding, which you then have a 
responsibi1ity to share with others. (85)
Willinsky's repeated appeals for students to read for
"personal meaning" and for students to connect a text with
their "personal history" attest to his succumbing to the
"elementary ideological effect." Both Derrida's view of
language as a means of calling to question the ways
critical schools govern our reading of literature and
Belsey's reminder of how existing ideology promotes the
idea of an autonomous subj ect point to the ingenuousness of
Willinsky's assumptions about language, reading, and the
reader.
"The Subject Presumed to Know"
It is, in other words, as of the moment the 
student recognizes that learning has no term, 
that he can himself become a teacher, assume the 
position of teacher. But the position of the 
teacher is itself the position of the one who 
learns, of the one who teaches nothing other than 
the way he learns [original emphasis]. (Felman, 
JL 88)
What Felman emphasizes about an analytically informed 
reading pedagogy is both the interminable apprenticeship of
learners— student and teacher— and the dynamic nature of
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the "revolving reflexivity" of the triad of student, 
teacher, and the unconscious— its dynamism driven by the 
shifting and revolving of the learning and teaching roles 
of teacher and student. Although both Felman and Willinsky 
propose the elimination of the authoritative teacher, their 
rejection of authority results in very different proposals. 
Felman's literature teacher presumes no mastery; she or he, 
in fact, is "one who learns." Using Lacan's own teaching 
as an example, Felman tells of his efforts "to learn from 
the students his own knowledge" (JL 83); this, Felman 
suggests, may be accomplished in the classroom through 
accessing Otherness. Knowledge is not owned, and mastery 
is, says Felman, an "illusion," "a mirage" (83-84).
The primary deterrent to the interminable 
apprenticeship which Felman conceives is transference, the 
student's identification with the "subject presumed to 
know" (JL 84). With transference, the student is relieved 
"of any responsibility for the production or effects of 
knowledge" (Jay 785). He or she reflects (mirrors) what 
the teacher desires; the relationship becomes, argues Jay, 
"a relationship of identification instead of analysis," one 
which "fixes the positions of knowledge rather than 
questioning their assumptions or displacing their 
privileges" (785).
For Willinsky the chief obstacle to student autonomy 
is the authoritative teacher, though he posits that texts
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and literary critics also imperil autonomy. Willinsky 
suggests equipping students with reader-response techniques 
to replace teacher-dominated interpretation of texts. He 
believes his "New Literacy" formula best exemplified in 
David Bleich's idea of a reader-response oriented classroom 
(NL 105). He especially admires Bleich's practice of 
writing his own responses to a text at the same time that 
his students write theirs. Thus the teacher becomes, in 
Willinsky's attempt to abolish authority, a "source of 
inspiration [my emphasis]" (NL 106): she or he functions
in a modeling role.
However, Willinsky's attempt at establishing an 
egalitarian atmosphere with teachers as sources of 
inspiration provides an occasion for the transference 
Felman believes detrimental to education. Lacan says, "As 
soon as there is somewhere a subject presumed to know, 
there is transference" (qtd. in JL 85). Because Lacan has 
defined transference to be "the acting-out of the reality 
of the unconscious" (JL 85-86), Felman believes teaching is 
not a "purely cognitive, informative experience . . . [but] 
also an emotional experience" (JL 86). According to Lacan, 
transference is "love directed toward, addressed to, 
knowledge" (qtd. in JL 86). Though Willinsky theoretically 
moves the literature teacher to the margins of the 
classroom, he speaks of the teacher as a source of 
inspiration, and thus, potentially, the recipient of "love
directed toward, addressed to knowledge," Gregory Jay 
maintains that a "teacher . . . must take up the position 
of authority in order to displace it, and thus to teach the 
student how to doubt Mastery" (789).4 Willinsky praises 
Bleich's practice of sitting among his students, modeling 
responsive writing for them, and serving as a source of 
inspiration. But in no part of his interpretation of 
Bleich nor in the explanation of his own theories does 
Willinsky address preparing students to "doubt Mastery," to 
focus on the language of the text, or to examine what 
Belsey calls "the unspoken in the text" (138). Bleich's 
student "'knows' by virtue Of identification with the 
position of the teacher as the subject who knows," and when 
this happens, Jay states, "then there is no knowing in any 
productive sense" (789) .
Lacanian Interpretation
A reading pedagogy following the Lacanian model 
Shoshana Felman has described would emphasize a number of 
practices which Willinsky's organicism ignores or treats 
very differently. Analytic interpretation would insist on 
a close examination of texts, would orient the student 
toward production rather than consumption of meaning, would 
attempt to develop genuinely critical reading habits in 
students, and would emphasize what is obscure, unreadable,
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and contradictory in texts instead of stressing a text's 
meaningfulness and organic unity.
After rejecting reader-response theorist Stanley 
Fish's "Model Reader" or "super reader" and Louise 
Rosenblatt's reader-response theories for slighting the 
"'social' function of literature" (NL 102), Willinsky 
recommends Bleich's subjective variety of reader-response 
criticism in which the reader takes "ownership" of "new 
knowledge," re-creates his or her original feelings when 
reading the text and bonds to the work, and, finally, 
"brings the work into [his or her] history" (NL 105). 
According to Willinsky, Bleich believes that "critical 
judgements are implicit in emotional reactions" (qtd. in NL 
105), that finding "personal meaning" is essential, and 
that intersubjectivity ("thought collective") results from 
"recognizing the community . . . in which individual 
readings take place . . . "  (NL 107). In Willinsky's view 
Bleich's reader-response model values "emotional reactions" 
and personal responses to a text rather than a New Critical 
search for a single, definitive reading.
Willinsky thus sees in Bleich and other reader- 
response theorists "the undoing of the New Criticism" (NL 
95) .5 However, Belsey, Jonathan Loesberg, and Jane 
Tompkins have all pointed out that the two critical schools 
hold some basically identical views.6 Willinksy rejects 
Fish's "Model" or "super" reader because he believes "the
New Literacy has a need for a reader-response grounded in 
the practices of mortal readers" (NL 98). Calling Fish's 
reader-response "a sophisticated form of New Criticism," 
Belsey concludes that reader-response interpretation has 
become "the literary equivalent of populism, challenging 
the privilege of the author but offering instead the 
reader's intuition as a new source of authority" (34). No 
characterization of Willinsky's vision of the reader seems 
more appropriate than the description Belsey has drawn of 
"reader-power." Both his desire that readers find 
personal meaning in texts and his endorsement of Bleich's 
belief that critical judgments issue from emotional 
reactions to texts establish in his theory the primacy of 
reader intuition. This valuing of student intuition—  
coupled with his attempts to remove the authoritative 
teacher from the environment of the reader— becomes, in 
Belsey's words, "the literary equivalent of populism."
In Willinsky's pedagogy, reading is "self­
exploration, " the "principal thing about reading" being the 
idea "that you are to read for yourself, for the sense 
which books can make of, or add to, your own experience and 
understanding . . . "  (NL 85). Derrida, however, says that 
" [m]eaning is not personal. It does not depend on the 
subjective identity but on the field of different forces, 
the conflict of forces, which produces interpretations" 
(Interview, Kearns 21). Belsey has pointed out that the
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meanings of a single sentence "vary from one political
discourse to another . . . and to the extent that the
hearer participates in these political discourses, he or
she finds in the sentence one or more possible meanings"
(53). But, Belsey argues, these varied interpretations are
not subjective readings:
To posit an individual subject as an authority 
for a single meaning is to ignore the degree to 
which subjectivity itself is a discursive 
construction. To find a guarantee of meaning in 
the world or in experience is to ignore the fact 
that our experience of the world is itself 
articulated in language. (53)
Felman's Lacanian theory of reading would concentrate 
on the "field of forces" that Derrida refers to, focusing 
on what Willinsky derisively calls "an analysis of the 
artifact" (NL 95) "by scrutinizing the words on the page 
harder than the New Criticism ever had . . ." (Felperin 
255). A Lacanian reading pedagogy would not regard words as 
"translucent" and autonomous, nor would it strain to find 
"the organic unity that binds together irony, paradox, and 
ambiguity in a privileged . . . language . . . "  (Felperin 
255-56). Instead, it would disseminate, in the words 
Felman uses to describe de Man's teaching, "a lesson of 
suspicion" ("Postal" 54).
De Man himself has described the kind of close reading 
which would be reguired in what he calls rhetorical 
criticism. In "The Return to Philology," de Man tells of a 
class, "The Interpretation of Literature," taught in the
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1950s at Harvard University by Reuben Brower. He reveals
how Brower focused interpretation "on the way meaning is
conveyed rather than on the meaning itself"
(23). He characterizes Brower's insistence on close
reading as "an entirely innocuous and pragmatic precept"
which resulted in the transformation of students:
Students, as they began to write on the writings 
of others, were not to say anything that was not 
derived from the text they were considering.
They were not to make any statements that they 
could not support by a specific use of language 
that actually occurred in the text. They were 
asked, in other words, to begin bv reading texts 
closely as texts and not to move at once into the 
general context of human experience or history, 
(my emphasis) (RP 23)
Brower's students, in other words, were interpreting
literature by paying close attention "to the philological
and rhetorical devices of language," which, de Man
concludes, "is not the same as aesthetic appreciation
. . ." (RP 24) .
Willinsky's readers, however, are urged to connect
their reading with their life experiences and to "see how
literature and life go together" (NL 113). In requiring
close reading of the text, both de Man and Felman deny the
interpretive value of an aesthetic response. Felman says,
To read is then to read, specifically, the 
difference between life and language. The 
necessity of reading stems from the discrepancy 
between thought and life, between act and 
understanding, between the urge for freedom and 
the bondage in which language keeps us. Reading 
is an attempt to cancel this discrepancy, to set 
ourselves free of the signifying chain— of our 
entrapment in linguistic structures, to catch up
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with, and cancel out, the foolishness unwittingly 
exhibited by living [original emphasis].
("Postal” 55)
De Man contends that close reading can be "deeply
subversive" because it "respond[s] to structures of
language which it is the more or less secret aim of
literary teaching to keep hidden"; this close attention to
"the philological and rhetorical devices of language is not
the same as aesthetic appreciation . . . "  (RP 24).
However, Willinsky contends that emotional responses
to literature culminate in critical judgments and argues
that "students should experience the text in an aesthetic
manner . . . [original emphasis]" (NL 103). Indicating
that aesthetics derives from "philosophers of nature and of
the self rather than [from] philosophers of language," de
Man concludes that
[i]t is because we teach literature as an 
aesthetic function that we can move so easily 
from literature to its apparent prolongations in 
the spheres of self-knowledge, of religion, and 
of politics. (RP 25)
Literature, in de Man's view, should be taught "as a
rhetoric and a poetics," its justification being not the
dispersing of "cultural excellence" but the cultivation of
a "principle of disbelief" (RP 25).
A Lacanian reading model which insures the triadic 
relationship of student, teacher, and Otherness would 
concentrate not on the similarities and connections 
organicists strain to effect but on difference, on
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Otherness. While Willinsky appears to recognize gaps and
inconsistencies in texts, he offers an organicist's remedy:
We cannot thoroughly render or articulate the 
experience of reading; we can only sketch out 
parts piecemeal with perhaps a little imaginative 
fillincr-in for what goes missing. (my emphasis) 
(NL 98)
This urge to "fill in," to smooth over, to pull together, 
and to connect characterizes organicist philosophy.
Barbara Johnson, however, says that a text should not be 
"read solely in function of intentionality, meaningfulness, 
and representativity" but that what readers have 
"traditionally been trained to disregard, overcome, explain 
away, or edit out-— contradictions, obscurities, 
ambiguities, incoherences, discontinuities, ellipses, 
interruptions, repetitions, and plays of the signifier"— ■ 
should become the very objects of interpretation 
("Rigorous" 74). Nonetheless, Willinsky prescribes 
"imaginative filling-in for what goes missing."
Traditional pedagogy emphasizes self-reflection and 
dialogue. However, Felman demonstrates that self­
reflection is a kind of mirroring narcissism that cannot 
encompass that which is Other to the self. Since this 
Otherness is not available to us in self-reflection, Felman 
repeatedly refers to the "radically intersubjective" nature 
required of a pedagogy sensitive to accessing "new 
knowledge." What is needed, Felman maintains, is a new 
mode of reflexivity-—
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the process through which something turns back 
upon itself: a new mode of reflexivity that
necessarily incorporates a passage through the 
Other, not as a reflection of the self but as a 
radical difference from the self . . . .  (JL 60)
The self which returns is different from its former self;
ignorance, then, has become "structurally informative, in
an asymmetrically reflexive dialogue in which the
interlocutors— through language— inform each other of what
they do not know" (JL 60).
An organicist like Willinsky regards the reader as 
autonomous and centered, and he calls for students to see 
how reading connects them with the world and their place in 
the world. But Derrida and Belsey have shown that the 
subject is inscribed in language: "subjectivity itself is
a discursive construction . . . [and] our experience of the 
world is itself articulated in language" (Belsey 53). To 
insure student autonomy, Willinsky envisions the teacher's 
role to be that of inspirational leader. This 
"teacherless" structure, however, does not guarantee 
autonomy, for Felman demonstrates that transference— an 
identification with the "subject presumed to know"-— thwarts 
autonomy.
Reading, then, should introduce Otherness to students, 
the experiencing of that which is outside the self. A 
postmodern theory of interpretation would also encourage 
close reading of texts, the student's active production of 
meaning, the incorporation of genuinely critical reading
habits, and a search not for unity but for seams, 
junctures, obscurities, ambiguities, and contradictions in 
texts.
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Notes to Chapter 5
1. Willinsky acknowledges his use of Peter Elbow's well- 
known description of "writing without teachers" (The New 
Literacy, p. 85).
2. Willinsky dismisses Stanley Fish's immense influence 
in reader-response theory, saying that the New Literacy 
focuses on "real readers" and "mortal readers" rather than 
on the "model" or "super reader" of Fish. What he appears 
to avoid is Fish's insistence on close reading. Willinsky 
argues that actual readers are "too busily engaged" in 
reading to practice this close reading. See The New 
Literacy, p. 98.
3. Felman quotes Lacan as specifying that the unconscious 
is "transindividua1" and "not at the disposal of the 
subject." Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight, p. 
126.
4. Jasper Neel says the idea of teacher as "medium" or 
"unscrambling device" is a "scary idea" but that " . . .  
anyone who enters a high school classroom has assumed it—  
willy-nilly, ready or not." Neel believes high school 
teachers "literally define the reading process for most 
Americans, who, throughout their adult lives, will continue 
to 'receive' what they read through the scrambling device 
they were given in school" (p. 63, "Writing about 
Literature (or Country Ham)").
5. Willinsky finds New Critics Wimsatt and Beardsley's 
explanation of the "affective fallacy" especially offensive 
because he believes that the effect a work of literature 
has on a reader is of primary significance.
6. Tompkins has spoken of how both New Critics and 
reader-response theorists "assume that to specify meaning 
is criticism's ultimate goal" (qtd. in Loesberg 23). 
Loesberg links reader-response methods with intentionalism, 
saying that in attempting "to locate where and how specific 
meanings are produced, one will turn either to authors or 
to readers, either intention or response . . . "  (p. 22, 
"Intentionalism, Reader-Response and the Place of 
Deconstruction). Belsey thinks "a kind of implicit 
intentionalism" (p. 16) survived in the New Criticism while 
the New Critical emphasis on a single meaning remains a 
part of the interpretive communities of reader-response 
criticism (p. 29). See Belsey's Critical Practice.
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
Much of what has been called "Romantic" in twentieth- 
century American education is actually organic. While the 
Romantic poets and philosophers of the nineteenth century 
employed organic metaphors to express their longing for 
unity, another voice— a dominant voice— told of the reality 
of their separation and alienation. In labeling pedagogy 
as "Romantic," educators follow a very traditional reading 
of the Romantics, one fostered by literary historians and 
the New Criticism. The Romantics recognized consciousness 
or language as the origin of their separation: language
allowed them to think the difference between nature and 
human beings. Unselfconscious nature lacks temporal 
awareness, but the Romantics repeatedly demonstrated their 
own recognition of time and mortality.
This Romantic recognition and the revisionist readings 
of the 1960s and 1970s which first identified alienation as 
the primary Romantic experience have been entirely 
overlooked by educators who cling to old definitions and 
traditional conceptions of Romanticism. The Romantics 
were, according to de Man, "the first modern writers to 
have put into question, in the language of poetry, the 
ontological priority of the sensory object" (IS 16); they
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are, however, still being regarded by American education as 
nature worshipers who reconcile the division between nature 
and humankind.
It is, however, educators who insist on identification 
with nature-identifying desirable reform with natural 
living things. They pair student thinking with seed 
germination, the developing essay with the growth of the 
plant, and the movement of creative process with the onward 
motion of sea waves. They metaphorically identify their 
reform proposals with nature and life while simultaneously 
coupling the status quo with the machine and death. Their 
organic metaphors reveal an ontological urge inasmuch as 
their use of the natural image, "the expression most apt to 
gain our immediate acquiescence," reflects their attempts 
'•to draw closer and closer to the ontological status of the 
object . . . " (de Man, IS 7). In employing natural 
images, they link their reform with eternal life, with 
organic nature which is atemporal and unaware of death; the 
tradition they wish to eradicate, then, becomes death, the 
force opposing their living reforms.
Emerson is the Romantic whose thinking has most 
dominated American education. As do other educators, Dewey 
reads Emerson as the great unifier, a reconciler of subject 
and object, an advocate of continuity and integration.
Dewey's interpretation of the transparent eyeball passage 
in Nature defines an organic Emerson, who surrenders to
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"ecstatic communion," an act which Dewey believes 
illustrates the "natural continuity" between human beings 
and nature (AE 28-29). Perhaps the reading most typical of 
the way Emerson is misread by educators is Grant's 
interpretation of the roses in "Self-Reliance." Grant 
believes the roses indicative of Emerson's belief that 
humankind and nature are unified; however, in the rose 
passage Emerson laments the disunity of humanity and 
nature, for the rose lives above time while human beings 
are bound by time.
Emerson knew that language could not bridge the gap 
between subject and object, that language, in fact, created 
the gap (Kronick 61); but Dewey subscribed to a symbolic 
theory of language: words are instruments of communication
which can be easily used and understood by communities of 
language users. Especially is Emerson's philosophy 
appropriated by organicist rhetoricians. Two schools of 
process theorists— expressionists and transactionalists—  
consider Emerson's philosophy (as well as Dewey's) 
foundational. Theorists such as Willinsky, Berlin, Wiley, 
Berthoff, Rohman and Wlecke, and Knoblauch and Brannon 
identify composing with the natural growth of a plant.
When Dewey defined his aesthetics, he too endorsed internal 
organization and organic form: the poem would determine
its own movement, "meaning and medium fusing as by a 
preestablished harmony" (AE 242). Creativity, then,
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becomes with organicist theorists an act of unfolding and 
not an act of conscious reflection.
What organicists disregard is language. They view 
language and the imagination as implements of mediation. 
Metaphysica1ly, they assume language connects. Language, 
in their view, is communication: writing and reading
result, they argue, in shared meaning. What they do not 
recognize is difference or Otherness. In literature, 
Willinsky asks students to interpret on the basis of their 
emotional and personal responses to a text— responses 
which, when shared with a community of readers, will 
connect the individual with the larger community. His is a 
reading theory of connection and integration, a theory 
which fails to incorporate any idea of language and its 
significance in constituting subjectivity. Shoshana 
Felman's proposal of a dialogic triad of student, teacher, 
and Otherness, however, breaks down the mirroring, 
dualistic association of teacher and student and introduces 
the unconscious as an access route to new knowledge.
The organicists' insistence on connection, wholism, 
and unity is established through metaphor, but these 
educators "fail to realize that the very fact that the 
relationship has to be established within the medium of 
language indicates that it does not exist in actuality” (de 
Man IS 8). J. Hillis Miller tells of how the conclusion of 
Wutherina Heights leaves readers unsatisfied at the "state
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of unappeased desire"; therefore, critics have attempted to
"explain" the novel, to smooth over the difficulties, and
to close the text in a definitive fashion. Miller says
that the metaphoric language used to describe the
"satisfying state of unity for which Cathy and Heathcliffe
yearn" is "by its very nature the thing that makes such
unity impossible" (67-68). Education suffers from a
similar desire to explain disunity, to smooth over the
difficulties. Language, however— even green images of
plants or blooming roses or waves of the sea— cannot make
two one. Miller says:
. . . the intuition of an original state of unity 
. . . .  is a projection outward of a oneness, a 
unity which never was nor could be, from the 
state of twoness within. This duality is within 
the self, within the relation of the self to 
another, within society, and within language.
The sense that there must at some time have been 
an original state of unity is generated by the 
state of division itself as a haunting insight, 
always at the corner or at the blind center of 
vision, where sight fails . . . .  "it" exists 
only in language. It exists in the experience of 
things as traces of something absent, something 
that never was or could be present. (68)
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